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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GARKANE POWF.R COM- I 
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VR. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF urrAH, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 6186 
In a case numbered 2262 before the Public Service 
Commission of the State of Utah, initiated by the 
filing of an application on June 1, 1939, the Gar kane 
Power Company, Inc., a corporation, by Ralph B. Black-
burn, President, and Warren W. Porter, attorney, 
applied for exemption from obtaining a Certificate of 
Convenienee a11d N eeessity and in the alternative for a 
Certifieate of Convenienee and Necessity authorizing 
the cons! ruetion of elect ric transmission lines and dis-
tributing system from M t. Carmel Junction, in Kane 
County, Utah, to Escalante, Utah, in Garfield County, 
a distance of approximately 110 miles, with an electric 
generating plant at Hatch, Utah, in Garfield County. 
(Page 20, rl'nmscript aJl(l Proceedings before the Public 
Servi(~e Commission.) (rl'r. 20). 
In that applieation it \vas sd out that the applicant 
was a coqlOration of the State of Utah; that it was a 
membership corporation organized awl operated on the 
eooperative plau. 'l'hat the applieant had contracted 
with the Rural {1J]eetrifieation Administration of the 
Federal Government to borrow the sum of $177,000, for 
the use of the applieant, the Garkane Power Company, 
for the purposes of building and operating an electric 
transmission line and generating plant. It was alleged 
in the Petition that the applicant had obtained permis-
sion to construet transmission and distribution lines 
along and over State highways, and that the County 
Commissioners had also given the right to construct 
Raid lines over and along County highways. That fran-
chises for the construction and operation of the Garkane 
Power Company and its transmission and distributing 
lines had been secured from the townR of Orderville, 
Glendale, Alton, Hatch, Tropie, Cannonville, Henrieville, 
and Escalante. It was alleged in said application that 
they were the towns to be served by said transmission 
and distrilmtion line. 'l'be fnmchiseR ranged from a 
period of 20 years to ~J9 years, and authorized the appli-
cant to occupy the streets, alleys, and public places in 
said towns with poleR, eonduitR, transmission appurte-
nances for the purpose uf supplying electricity to the 
members of 1 he Garkane Power Company. 
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The avplieation set out that the contract between the 
Gar kane Power Company and ilH~ U nitcd States of 
America was known as NumhEr R. K 42, dated Sep-
tember 30, 1!)38; that a first mortgagE note had been 
executed by Garkanu Power Compnny awl made vayable 
to the United Staie::-; of Arm~riea, and a deed of trust had 
been made between the Power Company and the Conti-
nental National Bank anrl 'l'nmt Company of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, as trustee, dated October 1, 1!)~~8. The money 
borrowed from the United States Government was to 
be paid hack over a period of 20 years. 'rhat sum, 
together \Vith all addHional amount of ~~8,000, for the 
purpose of assisting members of the Company to wire 
their premises and purchase electrical appliances, had 
been allotted. 
The application further set forth that the applicant 
respectfully representerl that in view of the provisions 
of its Articles of Incorporation and its intent, pursuant 
thereto, to serve its members only, it was not a public 
utility, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Puhlie Service Commissioll. lt was furtlwr set out 
in the Petition that llJL' ajJpiiumt, the Garkane Power 
Company, aml tlw Orderville Lighi and PO\ver Company 
had entered into an agreenwnt through which all of the 
assets were to he transferred to tlw Garkane Power 
Company, lne. 'l'lJat tlw inhahita11tro; of the Raid town 
of 0rderville had held an elcel ion at which there was 
voted that tlw 'l'own Board rlispoHe of the holdings and 
assets of the Esealante Li[.;l1l and Power Company. 
'l'lwt appiieation \Yas swom lo by Mr. Halph B. 
Blaekburn, who verified it as required Ly law. There-
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after hearings were he1d on l:laid application and the 
Commission entered a Hcport nwl Order on August 10, 
1939, granting a Certificate of Convenience ancl N eces-
sity to the Garlcane Po\\'er (jompnny according to its 
application. rrhe Commission assumed jurisdiction of 
the Company, but gnmtccl the Certificate for which the 
Company had asked. 
The Garkmw Company then filed an application 
for re-l1cariug, which was denied September 6, 1939. 
This matter theu came before tho Supn~me Court upon 
the filing by the Garbmc Company, lne., a corpora-
tion, of a Petition for a ~Writ of Certiorari, which Writ 
was directed by the Snprome Court of this State to 
the Public SerYice Commif-JsioH of Utah on October 6, 
1939, and return thereon made by the Secretary of 
the Public Service Commi:;::;iou of Utah, October 18, 
1939. This return included aU of the papE)rs, letters, 
and proceedings had or eoncerning llw case numbered 
2262, before the PnhJ ic Senriee Commission of Utah, 
entitled "In the 1\lnit<.;i' of Ute Application of Garkane 
Power Company, Inc., etc.'' 
When tlte matter of the application was under 
consideration, the Public Scrvim~ Commission received 
a Brief from the Hurai ]1;!ce~1·ifieatiou Administration, 
WashiiJgtou, D. C., dated .J unc 10, 19:39. (Page 27 of 
the Commission's 'rnuweripL.) ('l'ranseript 69). This 
Brief was aeeompaHicd by a letter from Marvin F. 
Hartung, Assiscant Uouusoi uf lhe Hural Electrification 
Administration. 
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It will he noted that a c~omplde invcRtigntion waR 
made hy the Puhlie Sc~rviee CommiRRion of the matter, 
before tlH' 0r<1er of the CommiRRion waR mad<~. ;\1 any 
witneRRCR wen~ lwanl, aR iR shown hy the two tranR-
ReriptR ntlaehecl to tlw return of the CommiRRi<m. ('l'rau-
Reripi :17:i). 'l'he Staff of llw CommiRsiml ma<1e a 
eomplPtc invc~Rtigation of the propoRcd Company's Rer-
Vl<'e. 'l'lw l"l'cord is replete with letters between the 
Puhlie Serviee CommiRRion aJI(l the Garkmw Powpr 
Company or itR attorney. 
Undc~r date of DeePmller 2, 1~li~7, Warran \V. Podn, 
of Panguiteh, Utah, as attorney for the Garfield-Kane 
County Hund Powc'r Co-op Assoeiation, indieatPd that 
a Petition would bc~ made to the Puhlie Serviee Com-
mission for a Certifieate of Convenimwe all<l NeeesRity. 
This Garfiel<l-Kane Hural Power Co-op ARsoeiation was 
the tentative name adopted for the aRsociation whi<:h 
later became tlw Garkane Power Company, Inc. 
A HPsolutioll ('l'ranscript 18) Retting forth the atti-
tude of the Garkane Power Company, lrw., was later 
filed with the Commission 011 or about Uw 12th day of 
May, A. D., 19:~9. ln that reHolution il1e PrPRideut and 
Dire<:torR of thc> Garkane Powc~r Company eontended 
that the (~ompany was a Co-operative non-profit eorpo-
ration organi;-;ed for tlw purpose~ of generating- eleetric·ity 
and the t ranHmiHHion of the Harne. 'l'hc HeHolution fur-
ther Raid that it waR helic•vc•d by Uw Raid Company tltat 
the Publie Serviee CommisRion of Utah had 110 juriH-
didion of the Company at all. H waR stated in that 
Hesulution that the Company had a memherHhip of 
approximately 700, and it was stated by the Board of 
Directors that they "resent the action of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah, in the particular herein-
before set forth, as arbitrary, dictatorial, non sequitur, 
contrary to the spirit and intent of the statutes defining 
the powers and jurisdictions of the Commission, contrary 
to public policy, contrary to the policies of the Rural 
Electrification Administration, a Governmental agency 
created by the present Democratic Administration for 
the sole and express purpose that its peoples living in 
remote and rural areas and not supplied with central 
station service might be supplied with electric energy 
made available for their use at the least possible cost 
and lowest possible rates." (Transcript 18). 
The Commission had before it the Affidavit which 
constitutes the Charter and the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Gar kane Po'wer Company, Inc. ( 'l'ranscript 35). 
It will be noted that among the powers given to the 
Company in its charter are: 
(1) 'l_1he power to generate, manufacture, purchase, 
acqmre, and accumulate electrical energy for its mem-
bers, and to transmit, distribute, furnish, sell, and dis-
pose of such electrical energy to its members only, and 
to construct, erect, purchase, lease as lessee, and in any 
manner acquire, own, hold, maintain, operate, sell, dis-
pose of, lease as lessor, exchange and mortgage plants, 
buildings, works, machinery, supplies, apparatus, equip-
ment and electrical transmission and distribution lines 
or systems m~eossary, convenient, or useful for carrying 
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out and aceomplishing any or all of the purposes of 
the corporation. 
(2) To acquire, own, hold, use, exercise, and to the 
extent permitted by law to sell, pledge, mortgage, hy-
pothecate, and in any manner dispose of franchises, 
rights, privilegeH, licenses, rights of \vay, and easementH 
necessary, useful, or appropriate to accomplish any or 
all of the purposes of the corporation. 
( 3) 'l'o pnrchaHe, receive, lease as le8see, or in any 
other manner acquire, own, bold, maintain, UHe, convey, 
sell, lease as les::wr, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other-
wise dispose of any and all real proiJCrty or personal 
property, or any interest therein, necessary, useful, or 
appropriate to enable the corporation to accomplish any 
or all of its purposes. 
( 4) 'l'o borrow money and to make notes and bonds 
and other evideiwPs of imleLtedness, and to pledge or 
mortgage the property of the Company. 
'rhe A rtieles also provide ( 'rrallHcri pt 40) that any 
person, firm, corporation or body politic, in addition 
to thl~ ineorporator8 of tlw C()rporation, may become a 
member in tlw eorporation by: (a) Paying tlw member-
ship fee aH herein specified ; (b) Agreeing to purchase 
from the corporation the amount of electrical energy 
hereinafter speeified; and (e) Agreeing to be bound by 
the Articles of Incorporation awJ the by-laws of the 
corporation and auy amendmontR thereof, and sueh rules 
and regulations aR may from time to time be adopted by 
the Board of Directors of the corporation; provided, 
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however, that no person, firm, corporation, or body 
politic, exeept the incorporators of the corporation, shall 
become a member in the corporation unless or until he, 
she, or it has been accepted for membership by the 
affirmative vote by a majority of the Board of Directors 
of the corporation; provided further, however, that if 
any applicant's application for membership has not 
been accepted or has been rejected by the Board of 
Direetors prior to the first meeting of the members 
following the date of said application, such application 
shall be submitted by the Board of Directors to such 
meeting of the members and subject to compliance by 
the applieant with the conditions set forth in subdivi-
sions (a), (h), and (e). Such application for member-
ship may be accepted by a vote of the members at such 
meeting, and the action of the members with respect 
thereto shall be final. rPhe Secretary of the corporation 
shall give any surh applicant at least ten days prior 
notice of the date of the memhers' meeting to which his 
application will be submitted and such applicant may be 
present and heard at the meeting. No person, firm, cor-
poration, or body politic may own more than one mem-
bership in the eorporation. 
It is also provided that the membership fee shall be 
$5.00, and that the fee after tl1e determination and loca-
tion and construction of the transmission lines of the 
corporation :,.;hall be $10.00. It is also provided that 
each member of the eorporation shall purchase not less 
than the minimum amount of electrical energy which 
shall from time to time be determined by the Board of 
Directors of the corporation by Resolution. It is also 
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provided that the Board of Diredon; may by their vote 
expel any member of the corporation for certain causes. 
There is a rather interesting paragraph in the Arti-
cles ('l'nwseript 42), which provides in effeet that the 
corporation may sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dis-
pose of services of all kinds, including eleetrical energy 
and personal property aequirod for resale, and mer-
ehandise. 'l'lwre is a provision that other tllld additional 
property may he sold, mor·tgaged, or leased upcm a vote~ 
of the majority of the membership, hut it appears that 
no vote is neeeRsary to allow the <•.orporatiou to sell, 
mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of (h) servires of 
all kinds, iueluding eleetriC'al energy, (e) personal prop-
erty acquired for resale, and (d) merchandise. lt is al:-;o 
provi<led that the Board of Direetors may borrow money 
from tlw U nite<l States of Am<~ rica and issue bonds, 
notes, all(1 mortgages for tlw money so borrowed. 
It appears that tho:,;e A rtielos were amended, hut 
the amendments do not appear, so far as I have been able 
to find, in the l:Gxhihits submitted to the Commission. 
'l'he amendments, as found in the Secretary of State's 
office, provided that Section 1i3 he amended to read as 
follows: 
"(13) 'l'he membership fee shall be $5.00 
whieh shall entitle the member to one serviC'e 
eonneetion. An additional fee of $3.00 shall he 
paid for each additional service connection re-
q nested by the member." 
Section 18 was also amended to read: 
"(18) (a) Membership in the corporation 
and a certificate representing the same shall not 
be transferrable, except as hereinafter otherwise 
providotl, awl npon tho death, cessation, or exist-
ence, expulsion or withdrawal of a member the 
memher;-;hip of ;-;uch mern!wr shall thereupon ter-
minate, a11Cl the certificate of membership of such 
member shall be smTondorod forthwith to the 
corporation. 'l'onnination of membership in any 
manner shall operate as a release of all right, 
title and interest of tho member in tho property 
and assets of the corporation; provided, however, 
that such termination of membership shall not 
release the member from the debts or liabilities 
of such member to the corporation. (b) A mem-
bership may he transferred by a member to him-
self or herself and his or her spouse, as the 
case may be, jointly upon tho written request of 
such member and compliance by such husband 
and wife jointly with the provisions of subdivi-
sions (b) and (c) of sodion 12 of these articles 
of incorpmation. Such transfer shall be made 
and recorded on the books of the corporation 
and such joint membership notecl on tho original 
certifieate representing the member~::Jhip so trans-
ferred. (e) When a member~::Jhip is held jointly 
by a hushaml ~l!ld wife, upon the death of either 
such mem1Jersl11p t:Jhall be deemed to be held solely 
by the survivor with Uw ;-;arne effed as though 
such memlwn;hip had been originally issued solely 
to him or her, as Uw ease may be, and the joint 
momber;;.;bip ecrtifieate may be surrendered by the 
survivor am1 upon the reeonling of l::luch death 
on the hooks of the corporation the eertifieate may 
be reissued to all(l in the name of the survivor; 
provided, hmwover, that the estate of the deceased 
shall not bt' rekafwd from any membership debts 
or liabilities to the eorporation." 
Section 1~) was also ameuded to reaJ: 
"(1!!) 'l'hP corporation may not sell, mort-
gage, ltmse or otlwrwise dispose of or encumber 
any of its property other than: (a) property 
which in the judgment of the board of directors 
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neither is nor will be ueeessary or useful in oper-
ating and maintaining the eorporation's system 
and facilities; provided, however, that all sales of 
such property shall not in any one ( 1) year ex-
ceed ill value ten per ecntum (10%) of the value 
of all the property of the corporation; (b) ser-
vices of all kinds, ineluding electric energy; and 
(c) persomd pro1>erty aeq ui red for resale; unless 
such sale, mortgage, 1ease, or other disposition 
or eneumhraw~e is authorized at a meeting of the 
members by the affirmative vote of at least 
two-thirds (2/3) of tlw members voting thereon 
at such meeting ill pen.;on or by proxy, and the 
notice of sueh proposed sal(~, mortgage, lease or 
other dis posit ioll or eneumhrance slmll have been 
contained in the notiee of 1lw meeting; provided, 
however, that not\\'ii.hsLmHliug anything herein 
contained, the board of directors without authori-
zation by the memben.;, shall have full power and 
authority to burrow money from the United 
States of Amcriea, Hc(~onsiruction Finance Cor-
poration, or any ngeiJC'Y or instrumentality there-
of, and in eonneetion with such borrowing to 
authorize the making awl is:-;uanee of bonds, notes 
or other evidences of indel1tedness and, to secure 
tlu~ payment thereof, to authorize the execution 
and delivery of a mortgage or mortgages, or a 
deed or deeds of trust upon, or the pledging or 
encumbraneiug of any or all of the property or 
assets, rightH, privileges, liemtses, franchises and 
permits of the eorporaiioll, whether ac(1uired, and 
wherever situated, all upon Hueh terms and condi-
tions as the board of dircctorH shall determine." 
It appears that eertain franehises were grauted to 
the corporation. ('l'ranseript 43, 46, 47, 4~), 51, 5:), 55, 57). 
While thert> is no questiou raiHcd as to procedure, 
the record will show that due notice was given to the 
Garkane Power Company aud the Company introduced 
witnesses, who were sworn and testified. After the hear-
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ing before the Commission, the Commission made its 
Report and Order (Transcript 138-142). The findings 
of the Commission as to jurisdiction of the Commission 
are found in Transcript 140, 141. The Commission 
found that "as a matter of actual practice the applicant 
will render service to any member of the public located 
within the territory served by its system who is willing 
to pay the membership fees and the rates for its service. 
This is in reality a rendition of service to the general 
public, which makes tho organization a public utility as 
defined by law.'' The Commission found that the appli-
cant was subject to the jurisuiction of the Public Ser-
vice Commission of the State of Utah, and granted a 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, sub-
ject to the laws governing a utility granted such Certifi-
cate. 
STATUTES 
The Garkano Power Corporation was formed for 
the main purpose of receiving a loan under the provi-
sions of an Act known as ''An Act to Provide for Rural 
Electrification," known as S. B. 3483, Public Number 
605, dated May 20, 19:36, which is the Rural Electrifica-
tion Act of 1936, passed by the Congress of the United 
States ( 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U. S. C. A. Section 901-914). 
That Act in part provides for the making of loans for 
the purpose of rural electrification and the furnishing 
of electrical energy to persons in rural areas who are 
not receiving eentral station service. 
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Th<• Aet provides: 
'"l'hat no loan for the construction, operati()ll 
or eulargement of any gmwrating plcmt shall be 
made unleHH the eousent of the ~)tate a nthority 
having jurisdiction in Ow premiHL'S iH firHt ob-
tai ned.'' 
'l'he Aet further providL•s that: 
'' rl'he admilliRtraJor iR anJ horir.Pd all(} empOW-
ered to bid for and purehase at any forecloRure 
or other sale, or ot h!'rwise to aeq ui re, property 
pledged or mortgaw•d to Hecnre any loan madl~ 
pursuant to thiN ad; to pay the purchase priee 
and any eosts and exw•nsnH irwurred in eomw<·-
tion therewith from the sumH authorir.ed in Sec-
tion H of Uris ad; to aceepi title to any property 
so purdrased or aequin•d in the name of tire 
United States of America; to operate or leasL~ 
RlWir property for sueJr rwriod as may lw df~emt~d 
JW<'L'Hsary or advisable; to protnet tl1e i1rvestmtmt 
therein, hut not to <'X<'l~C'd fiYL~ years aftPr the 
a<~quisitimr tlwreof; ami to Rell such property so 
purchased awl acquired upon such 1<•rms and for 
Hudr cmrsideration aH tire Admi11istrator Hhall 
ddermine to hL~ n~asortahh~." 
The question hdore this Court n•volvL~H aronll(l 
the Htatus of the Garkane Power Company, chartered 
as aforesaiLl, and with the purposes lwreinhdore set 
out, with relation to tire following RlWl iolls of the He-
viHed StatuteH of Utah, l!l:t~: 
"Sedion 7G-2-1 (19): 'L'l1e term 'eledric 
planl' indudeH all real estate a]](l fixtures and 
fH~tw>wtl propL~rty owned, eontrolled, operated or 
managed ill eonnediou with or to faeilitate Url) 
produetion, generation, transmission, delivery or 
fumiHhiug of electrieiiy for light, heat or power, 
arrd all eonduits, ducts or other deviees, mat<~rials, 
apparatus or property for eontaining, holding, or 
1') d 
carrymg eouducLors nsc:d or to be used for the 
transmission of elecLriciLy for light, heat or 
power.'' 
"Section 7G-2-1 (20): 'l'he term 'electrical 
corporation' iHC'lndm; every corporation and per-
son, tlwir lessees, 1rmli cos, and receivers or 
trustees nppoinLed by any court whatsoever, own-
ing, coutroliiug, opnrating· or managiHg any elec-
tric plant, or iu ;mywise furniHhiug electric power, 
for public r,;ervic:c ~within this state, except where 
eledricity is gmwraied ou or distributed by the 
producer through pri\'ate property aloue, solely 
for his own use or Uw twe of his tenants and not 
for sale to others." 
"Section 7G-2-l (28): 'l'lw term 'public util-
ity' includes (;n:ry common earrier, gas corpora-
tion, elodrie (~orporation, teicpltone corporation, 
telegTa ph eorpond i rm, wale r corpora tiou, heat 
corporation ;md wand10uscman wlwre Uw service 
is performed for, or the eommodity delivered to, 
the public gcm•raliy. And wiwuovor any common 
carrier, g<lS corporntio11, c~cdrieal eorporatiou, 
telephone co1·pomi io11, Je!egTaplt eorporatiou, 
water corporal ion, Lc<Ji corporation or warehouse-
man perforrm; a sc•ry] ee for or delivers a eom-
modity to tlw pnlJ:le for which auy compcm;ation 
or paymmtl wlwh3ol~\-er is n:celvcd, snell common 
carrier, gas ('Ol'[lOration, eledrieal corporation, 
telephone corporation, telegraph eorywration, 
water corporation, lt(•c;t corporation and ware-
housemall is lwre!Jy dec.!nred to he a public utility, 
subject to the jur:s,11cticm awl regulation of the 
commission awl to ilw provisions of this title. 
When any vonwu or eorpond ion performs any 
such servic·e for ('l' deiiVL:n; a11y sueh commodity 
to any puhli(~ utiiiiy l10n:i11 defined sueh person 
or eorporatiou, and (~ad1 ilwreof, is hereby de-
clared to he a pulllie ul· ty, nml to be subject to 
the juriHdietiou {Uld regnl:t t ion of the commission 
and to tltc provisim1s of tbis title. Any corpo-
ration or pen.;o11 11ot cugugcd in business exclu-
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sively as a public utility as hereinbefore defined 
shall be governed by the provisions of this title 
in respect only to the public utility or public 
utilities ow11ed, controlled, operated or managed 
by it or by him, and 11ot in resped to any other 
business or pursuit.'' 
"Seetion 76-4-1 : The commission Is hereby 
vested with power and jurisdietion to supervise 
and regulate every public utility i11 this state, 
and to supervise all of the business of every such 
public utility in this state and to do all things, 
whether herein speeific·ally designated or in addi-
tion thereto, w hieh are necessary or convenient 
in the exerei:se of sueh power and jurisdiction.'' 
"Sedion 76-4-24: ( 1) No railroad corpora-
tion, street railroad corporation, serial bucket 
tramway corpora tiou, gas corporation, electrical 
corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph cor-
poration, heat corporation, automobile corpora-
tion or water corporation shall henceforth estab-
lish, or begin com;truetion or operation of a rail-
road, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, line 
route, piau or system, or of any extension of such 
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, 
line, route, plant or system, without having first 
o btaincd from the commission a certificate that 
present or future public convenience and necessity 
docs or will require such construetion; provided, 
that this section shall not be construed to require 
any such corporation to secure such certificate 
for an extension within any eity or tow11 within 
which it shall have heretofore lawfully commenced 
operations, or for all extension i11to territory, 
either within or without a city or town, contiguous 
to its railroad, street railroad, aerial lmcket tram-
way, line, plant, or system not theretofore served 
by a public utility of like eharader, or for an ex-
tension, within or to territory already served by 
it, necessary in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness; provided further, that if any publie utility 
in eonstructing or extending its line, plant or 
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system shall interfere or he about to interfere 
with the operatio11 of the line, pbmt or system of 
any other puhlie utility already emtstructed, the 
eommis:-;ion on <·omplaillt of the public utility 
elaiming to he injnriou:-;ly affected, may, after 
bearing, makL> sueh ord<~r aml prescribe such terms 
and eondit ions for the location of the lines, plants 
or systems affected a:-; to it may seem just and 
reasoua ble.'' 
"(2) No public utility of a class specified 
in suhseetio11 (1) hereof shall henceforth exercise 
any right or privilege under any franchise or 
permit hereafter granted, or mtder any franehise 
or permit heretofore granted but not heretofore 
aduallv exerci:-;ed or the exercise of which has 
been s~spended for more than one year, without 
first having obtained from the commission a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity re-
quire the exerei:-;e of such right or privilege; pro-
vided, that when the commission shall find, after 
!waring, that a public utility has heretofore begun 
actual constrnctio11 work and is pro:-;eeutiug such 
work in good faith, uninterruptedly and with rea-
sonable diligence in proportion to the magnitude 
of the undertaking under any franchise or permit 
heretofore grantt~d but not heretofore actually 
exercised, such publie utility may proceed, under 
sudt rules a11d regulations a:-; the commission may 
prescribe, to the eompletion of such right or 
privilege; awl provided further, that this sec-
tion shall not he construed to validate any right 
or privilege now invalid or hereafter becoming 
invalid under any law of this state. 
"(3) l<~very amJlieant for sueh a eertificate 
shall file in the offiee of the eommis:-;ion sueh 
e\ridence as shall he reeei ved by the eommission 
to :-;how that snd1 applic·ant has received the 
required <·on:-;ent, franc It i se or permit of the 
proper eounty, city, munieipal or other public 
authority. The eommission :-;hall have power, 
after a !tearing, to i:-;sue said certificate as prayed 
for or to refuse to issue the snme, or to issue it 
for the eoustruetion of a portion only of till' <'OJl-
templated railroad, street railroad, aerial buekct 
tramway, line, plant or system, or extc~nsion 
then~of, or for the partial exercise only of sai<l 
right or privilege alJ(l may attaelt to thP exereise 
of tlw rig!It.s granted hy said eertificatc such 
terms and conditions ar,; in itr,; judgment puhlie 
eonvenience and 1wcer,;sity may require. If a 
puhlie utility desires to exerc~ise a right or privi-
lege under a franchir,;e or permit whieh it eontem-
plater,; securing hut which hm.; not ynt ]wen granted 
to it, sueh puhlie utility may apply to the earn-
mission for an order prelimiuary to the ir,;sne of 
the eertifieatl~. 'l'lw <·ommir,;sion may thereupon 
make an order declaring that it will tlwreaftcr 
upon applicatiou, under sneh ruler,; and regula-
tions as it may prescribe, isr,;ue the deHired eeJ·-
tifieate upon sueh terms all(l couditiollH ar,; it may 
designate after the public utility has ohtained 
sueh eontempla ted fnmehisl~ or permit. Upon 
presentation to the eommission of evidence sat-
isfactory to it that sueh franchise or permit has 
been seem·ed by such puhlie utility, the eommiH-
Hion shall thereupon ir,;sne stwh eprtifieate." 
'l'he statutes above referred to are suhstautially the 
seetions which were first adopted by the Legislature of 
Utah in the 12th regular sesHion of the Leg-islature of the 
State of Utah in 1~n 7. 'l'his Aet was knowu ar,; S. B. 4G, 
and when e11aeted into law war,; known aH Chapter 47, 
Laws of Utah, 1D17. 'l'!tat Aet war,; earried i11to the 
Compiled Laws of Utah, EH7, under 'ritle 91 thereof. 
'l'he 1917 Aet, as found in the Lawr,; of Utah 1n7, page 
137 ( aa), provided : 
"rrlw term 'public utility,' when used in this 
Act, includPs every common <mrrier, gas corpora-
tion, autrnnobile corporation, eledric corporation, 
tL•lephone eorporation, telegraph corporation, 
17 
water corporation, heat corporation, and ware-
housemen, where tlw service is performed for or 
the commodity delivered to the public or any 
portion thereof. The term 'public or any portion 
thereof', as herein used means the public gener-
ally, or any limited portion of the public includ-
ing a person, pri uatc corporation, municipality, 
or other political subdivision of the State, to 
which the service is performed or to which the 
commodity is delivered, ami whenever any com-
mon carrier, gas corporation, automobile corpo-
ration, electrical corporation, telephone corpora-
tion, telegraph corporation, water corporation, 
heat corporation or warehouseman, performs a 
service or delivers a commodity to the public 
or any portion thereof for which any compensa-
tion or payment whatsoever is received, such 
common carrier, gas corporation, automobile cor-
poration, electrical corporation, telephone corpo-
ration, telegraph corporation, water corporation, 
heat corporation and warehouseman, is hereby 
declared to be a public utility subject to the juris-
diction and regulation of tho commission and the 
provisions of this Act. Furthermore, when any 
person or corporation performs any such service 
or delivers any such commodity to any public 
utility herein defined, such person or corporation 
and each thereof is hereby declared to be a public 
utility and to be subject to the jurisdiction and 
regulation of the commission, and to the provi-
sions of this Act. 
''Any corporation or person not being en-
gaged in business exclusively as a 'public utility', 
as hereinbefore defiued, shall be governed by the 
provisions of this Act in respect only of the 
'public utility' or 'public utilities' owned, con-
trolled, operated or managed by it or by him, and 
not in respect of any other business or pursuit." 
Part of the quotation above has been italicized to indi-
cate the words of the 1917 Act which were eliminated 
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when Section 76-2-1, (28), Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933 was adopted as the revision of the statutes of the 
State of Utah. 
It appears that the original Act contemplated bring-
mg under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Com-
mission every electric corporation delivering service to 
the public or any portion thereof, and that delivery of 
the service to a limited portion of the public, including 
a person, private corporation, municipality, or other 
political subdivision of the State, would constitute the 
electric corporation a public utility. 
It is the contention of the Public Service Commission 
that in construing the language of Section 76-2-1, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and especially paragraph 28 
thereof, that the Court must give due consideration to 
the intent of the Legislature in passing the Act, as evi-
denced by the language found in Chapter 47, Laws of 
Utah~rtiele 2, Section 1 (aa). See Board of Education 
of Ogden City Vii. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 159, Pac. 1019; 
Board of Education of Carbon County School District 
vs. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 Pac. 627; Neil vs. Utah 
Wholesale Gr·ocery Company, 61 Utah 22, 210 Pac. 201; 
Pollock vs. Mabey, 226 Pac. 186, 63 Utah 377; Ogden City 
vs. Borernan, 57 Pac. 843, 20 Utah 98; Price vs. Tuttle, 
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016; In re Application 7600, 63 
Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605; II ayes vs. Boss, 41 Utah 580, 
127 Pac. 340; Mar·ioneaux us. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac. 
355; Woodcock us. Board of Educat'ion of Salt Lake 
County, 55 Utah 458, 187 Pac. 181; 1'7ame:; vs. Board of 
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Commissioners of Cache County, 58 Utah 4~5, 199 
Pac. ~)7. 
And the Court is bound to inquire into the purpose 
sought to he accomplished by the Act. ( Plutus Mining 
Company vs. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132). 
And the Court should keep in mind the condition 
to which the Art was intended to apply. Buckle vs. 
Ogden l~'urndure and Carpet Company, 65 Utah 15~, 
216 Pae. 684; Utah Association Life, unde1·writers, vs. 
Mtn. States Life Insurance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200 
Pae. 673; United States Smelting Refining and Mining 
Company vs. Utah Power and Light Company, 58 Utah 
168, 197 Pac. 902. 
As to the effect of the revision of the original lan-
guage of the Act, I should like to call to the Court's 
attention the ease of Pratt us. Swan, 16 Utah 483. rt'hat 
ease eoncerned the Revised Statutes of 1898. The ques-
tion arose concerning the office of the Chief of Police 
and as to whether or not it had been abolished by the 
Revised Statutes. 'l'hat office was created by au Act 
of 18~4, was later repealed but substantially re-enacted. 
The Revised Statutes provided that they should take 
effect on .January 1, 18!)8, and a section therein provided 
that all laws uot excepted were repealed. Seetion 2482 
provides that: 
"All perso11s who, at the time said repeal 
shall take effect, shall hold any office under the 
statutes hereby repealed, shall continue to hold 
the same under the tenure thereof, except those 
offiees which are abolished, and those as to which 
:.lO 
a diffenmt proviRlOll IR made hy the Revised 
StatuteR." 
'l'he Court thereupon Rtated the queRtion as follows: 
"'l'he vital question, under sedion 2482, therefore, ts, 
waR the offiee abolished"?" 'l'he Court said: 
''No doubt it iR well eRtahliRhcd, as a general 
rule, that an unqualified repeal of a statute creat-
ing an offiee abolishes the office and removes 
the ineumbent; hut where, as in this ease, the 
repealing statute was enaeted, not for the pur-
poRe of abrogating all the laws, but mere]~, for 
the purpose of pffeeting a revision and eodifiea-
tion of the lmvs, the repealing statnteR must he 
construed in the ligl1t of the eireumsta!lc·es which 
surrounded its enaetment, a!l(l effeet must he 
given to the intent of the legislature, eve11 though 
the rerwal appears to he, in terms, express. In 
the general plan of revision, there was no design 
to absolutely repeal all the statutes of the Stale. 
Nor will a court assume heeanse of tht> repealing 
elause that in such plan there was an intention to 
abolish offices necessary to the public good or to 
remove the iueumbent thereof. 'l'lw evide11t dt)-
sign in the plan of revision was to eont imw in 
force the great body of the statutes, with some 
modifications and amendments, aR well as to C'Oll-
tinne in existcm·e tl1e officers necessary in the 
execution of the laws, nuder the Revised Statutes. 
'l'he. object, doubtless, waR not to abrogate or 
ehauge the law to any great exhmt, or to abolish 
offices or remove ineumhents, hut to reeoncile 
eontradidory enaetments and diserepaneim;, to 
remove doubts, aud weed out superfluous matter, 
to give the sauetion of positive law to rules whieh 
had previom;ly been promulgated and stood alone 
on the authority of usage, deduction, and judicial 
decision, and to render all enadments of Rtatute 
law more eoucise, clear, accurate, a!l(l praetieal." 
"The eorrectuess of theRe observations will 
heeome more evident when we eousider that, 
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simultaneously with the repeal, the great mass of 
the laws were re-enacted. Not an instant of time 
elapsed between the repeal and re-enactmnt. The 
repeal must therefore be regarded as merely a 
part of the means of revision, - as but a neces-
sary formality to substitute the Revised Statutes 
for the statutes as they were before the revision. 
The old statutes, in practical operation and effect, 
must be regarded by the courts, in construing the 
Revised Statutes and acts of amendment and 
repeal, as contiuued and modified, rather than as 
abrogated and uew ones enacted, although, in 
terms, all were repealed. The intent of the legis-
lature must prevail, even though opposed to the 
literal sense of the terms, and control the strict 
letter of the repealing statute; and where a par-
ticular construction, which appears to be included 
within the terms, would lead to absurd conse-
quences the court will, out of respect to the Legis-
lature, adopt some other construction which will 
avoid such consequences, if from the whole pur-
view it may fairly be done. The legislature can 
never be presumed to have intended an absurd 
thing. 'Where a law is plain and unambiguous, 
whether it be expressed in a general or limited 
terms, the legislature should be intended to mean 
what they have plainly expressed, and, conse-
quently, no room is left for construction. But if, 
from a view of the whole law, or from other laws 
in pari materia, the evident intention is different 
from the literal import of the terms employed to 
express it in a particular part of the law, that 
intention should prevail, for that in fact is the 
will of the legislature.'' 
The Court, basing its decision upon the rules quoted 
above held that the office in question was not abolished 
but continued in existence under the revision. 
In this matter we have not the same situation as 
was decided by your Honorable Court in the case of 
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State ex rel Porter vs. Ritchie, Judge, 32 Utah 381, 
for in that case the Court said, concerning a change 
made by the revisers of the statutes of 1898: 
'n_rhis change, however, cannot be held to be 
one where a section is re-written by revisers for 
the sake of brevity or condensation, with the 
view of retaining and making the original mean-
ing clearer; but the change was manifestly made 
for the purpose of preventing a misconstruction 
of the meaning of the statute and to so frame 
it that only one meaning is possible in view of 
the language used.'' 
The Court was of the opinion in that case that the 
provisions regarding a motion for a new trial in the 
old statute before the revision, left the matter in a 
somewhat confused state, and it was the intention of 
the revisers to eliminate that confusion. In any event, 
the language found in the Swan case, S'Upra, has not 
been overruled. The Court m the Ritchie ease 
merely laid down the rule that taking the old section 
with the new and comparing them, resulted in the con-
clusion that the Legislature intended to change the rule 
relating to new trials, for the Court says: 
''The change is too radical, according to the 
rules applied to ascertain the ordinary meaning 
of words, to admit of serious doubt. Where such 
is the case, the courts have no right to force 
into the new phraseology the old meaning.'' 
That situation does not exist with regard to the revision 
found in (28) of Section 76-2-1, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933. The rule applicable to this case is found in 
59 C. J. p. 894, Section 493, wherein it is said: 
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"A mere change of phraseology, or punc-
tuation, or the addition or omission of words 
in the revision or clarification of Htatutes, does 
not neeesHarily change the operation or effect 
thereof, and will be deemed to do so unless 
the intent to make such change is clear and 
unmistakable. U snally a revision of statutes 
simply iterates the former deelaration of legis-
lative will. No presumption arises from changes 
of this character that the revisers or the legis-
lature in adopting the revision intended to change 
the existing law; but the presumption is to the 
contrary, unless au iutent to change it clearly 
appears.'' 
See for the same rule, Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 12 Pacific 2nd 
649; In re Messler's estate, 1 Atlantic Reporter, 2nd 
series, 322, wherein the language of the court in the 
case of Leonard vs. Leonia II eights Land Company, 87 
Atlautic 645; Annotated cases 1914 C 749, was quoted 
as follows: 
"Statutes are not to be construed with our 
eyes closed to the history that lies back of them. 
The aet is ~ r~vision of preexisting legislation ru~tl ~1 the ~ftii!iN'i;t to change the law in a revision 
must be clear.'' 
See also Stearns 1:s. Omham, 74 Atl. 486; London Guar-
antee and Accident Company vs. Wisconsin Public Ser-
vice Commission, 279 N.W. 76. 
If we construe said section 76-2-1 in vww of the 
provisions of Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917, and 
Section 4782 (28), Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, it 
would appenr reasonable that the Legislature intended 
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to include in that term "public utility," such a corpora-
tion as the Garkane Power Company. 
THE GARKANE POWER COMPANY IS AN ELEC-
'rRICAL CORPORATION AND AFFECTED 
WITH SUCH PUBLIC IN'rERl1JST 'rHAT 
IT IS A PROPFJR SUBJECT OF 
REGULATION 
In the first place, the Garkane Company is a com-
pany owning and operating an "electric plant," as 
defined by (19), of Section 76-2-1, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933. This is clearly shown by the evidence 
adduced by the Commission. 
As the term "electrical corporation" is defined 
by the above statute, subdivision (20), said Company 
undoubtedly is organized for the purpose of furnishing 
electric power. As "public service" is used within that 
statute, it is apparent that the only exception placed 
upon the phrase by the Legislature occurs when the 
electricity is generated on or distributed by the pro-
ducers through private property alone, solely for his 
own use or the use of his tenants and not for sale to 
others. We do not have that situation here. This 
electricity is not generated or distributed by a pro-
ducer through private property alone, solely for his 
own use. Under whatever form this corporation oper-
ates, it is furnishing electrieal energy to approximately 
80% of the residents of the territory to be served by it; 
it is to that extent rendering public serviee within this 
State. 
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It clearly appears from the testimony and from the 
exhibits before the Commission that this Company 
intends to furnish electrical power to political subdi-
visions of the State, to-wit: certain cities or towns of 
the State. There is nothing to prevent this Company 
from selling power to a private power company, to 
another public utility or electrical corporation. It is 
clear from the testimony in the exhibits before the Com-
mission that the Garkane Company expects compensation 
for the electrical energy furnished, and I call the court's 
attention to the emphatic language (28) of said Sec-
tion 76-2-1, with the parts of the statute which we do 
not believe pertinent obliterated: 
''And whenever any * * * electrical corpora-
tion * * * performs a service for or delivers a 
commodity to the public, for which any compen-
sation or payment whatsoever is recei1;ed, such 
* * * electrical corporation is hereby declared 
to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction 
and regulation of the Commission and to the 
provisions of this title. 
It will be noted from the section that the Legisla-
ture has defined "public utility" as including an elec-
trical corporation, but the statute goes further and says 
that whenever any electrical corporation performs a 
service for compensation, such electrical corporation is 
declared to be a public utility. 
When the Legislature designated who or what re-
quired a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
(76-4-24, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), the Legis-
lature said that no electrical corporation should begin 
construction or operation of a plant or system without 
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having first obtained from the Commission a c•ertif'iea te 
that present and future public convenienee and necessity 
requires sueh construction. It is interesting to note that 
in said Rection it is provided that the Commission may 
prevent such public utility from interft~rring with the 
operation of any line, plant, or syRtem of any other 
public utility or to preRcrihe such terms and eoll(liticms 
for the location of the lines or syRtems affected as to it 
may seem just and reafwnahle. 
It iR clear that the Legislature had in mind that 
the purpose of its Act was not only to protect the con-
sumers of electrical energy of the Company applying 
for the certificate, but to protect any other Company in 
the field who also had consumers who might he affected 
by any new enterprise. ht other words, the public to 
be protected was not only that public served by the cor-
poration applying, but the entire public whose service 
might be interferred with or the portion of the public 
whose service might be interferred with. 'l'his is ap-
parent when one considers the history of the creation 
of public utilities and public service comm1sswns. 
In hiR work Guiding Principles of Public Service 
Regulation, Volume 1, Chapter 1, Henry C. Spurr, stated 
it thus: 
"Competition was the earliest form of regu-
lation; but this proved to be bad in tlw long run, 
for the consumers of utility service, as it too 
often meant duplication of facilities in a field not 
large or rieh enough to support more than one 
company. The usual outcome of this was consoli-
dation, follO\ved by recoupment, hy means of high 
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rates, by losses due to competition. Whatever 
may be the value of competition as a regulator 
of charges in other lines of business, it proved 
to be a failure in the public utility industry. It 
was a long time before this was understood, and 
even now it is not generally appreciated by the 
public." 
And, as the same author states, in exammmg the 
growth of jurisdiction of such Commissions, Chapter 
2, page 19: 
''Terms, such as: 'railroad,' 'street railroad,' 
'baggage company,' 'electrical plant,' 'telephone. 
line,' 'telegraph line,' 'steam plant,' 'stock yard,' 
and others arc also defined in the statutes of 
various states, with the same care, for the pur-
pose of indicating the precise extent and limi-
tation of commission jurisdiction. rro determine 
whether a commission has authority over a par-
ticular utility, it is, therefore, necessary to ex-
amine the statutory definitions. Usually there 
is not much chance for any question about it. 
All of the well known utilities, steam railroads, 
urban and interurban railroad companies, gas 
and electric companies, water companies, tele-
graph companies, easily fall within the definition 
of common carriers or public utilities contained 
in the commission laws.'' 
The writer of that work, on pages 20, 21, 22, and 23, 
discusses the questions that may arise under the defi-
nitions of such statutes, and after discussing the various 
holdings of various commissions, makes this comment: 
''It has been held that if the question of what 
constitutes a public utility is doubtful, it will be 
resolved in favor of the public service." 
Many methods of operation have been devised to 
bring into questio11 the jurisdiction of public service com-
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missiOns. Especially when the service IS such a service 
that it can plainly be said to be affected with a public 
interest from its very nature, to-wit: the furnishing of 
electrical energy, and this has been carried much further 
that that in the later decisions (Miami Laundry Com-
pany vs. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 183 
Southern 759, 119 A.L.R. 956). 
In the case of Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 
L. Ed. 77, it was held that a calling becomes public when 
it is devoted to a public use, when it becomes a public 
consequence, and affects the community at large; and in 
the case of James vs. Public Service Commission, 177 
Atl. 343, the court made this statement : 
''There are, however, enlargements and limi-
tation of the general terms of these definitions. 
No carrier serves all the public. His customers 
are limited by place, requirements, ability to pay 
and other facts. 'l'he public does not mean every-
body all the time. The status of one as a common 
carrier is not changed by an occasional refusal to 
perform services for which he is equipped or by 
the fact that he does not advertise, and the fact 
that one makes written eontracts with his patrons 
is not controlling in determining that question. 
What constitutes a common carrier is a question 
of law, but whether one eharged with being a 
common carrier has by his method of operation 
brought himself within that definition is a ques-
tion of faet to be determined from the evidence 
in each case as it arises. *** Mere schemes or 
devices to avoid the duties and responsibilities 
of a common carrier are impotent for the purpose 




And for a discussion of what services may properly be 
brought within the regulations of the Commission, see 
Oerman Allian(es Insurance Company vs. Kan._•;;as, 233 
u. s. 389. 
Since it has boon held that it is not what a company, 
by its articles, is authorized to do, alone, that deter-
mines its status, but what it actually does that must be 
considered in determining its status, it is well to ex-
amine some caRes where the courts have inquired into 
the status of companies when their operation was m 
a field affected with a public interest. 
In the case of Commonwealth Telephone Co vs. 
Carley, a WisconRin ease found at 213 N.\V. 469, the 
court had before it a question as to whether or not the 
company could prevent Carley and others from operating 
a telephone exchange beeause sueh exchange consti-
tuted a violation of the antiduplieation status of Wis-
consin. The court said: 
"Section 196.01 of the Statutes defines the 
term 'public utility,' and under this definition 
the distinguishing aml important feature which 
stampR a business as a public utility consists of 
the furnishing of those things speeifically em-
braced ill tho (lt>finition, to or for the public. 
ln determining whether a corporation is a public 
utility, and therefore suhjl~et to tho control of 
the Hailroad Commission, its acts, and not the 
authority collferred by ih; charter, control. State 
rs. Public 8en'ice Oornmission, 275 1\lo. 483, 205 
S.W. 36, 18 A.L.R. 7G4; In Chiprwwa Power Co. 
us. Railroad Oommission, 188 Wis. 246, 205 N.W. 
900, ii was held that the legislative defiuition of 
a public utility~ was inteudod to include all cor-
porntiom; that wore functioning as a public utility 
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under the guiRe of a private utility. No that, 
applying the holding of the Chippewa caRe above 
referred to, to the instant case, we must arrive at 
the concluRion that the defendantR lturein may 
he treated as public utilitieR, even though they 
were organized aR private corporationR, where in 
fact they operatl~d aR public utilitieR, and uot-
withRtanding the facts that they had not complied 
with the proviRions of the Public Utility Act, 
which includeR tlte antiduplieation Rtatute." 
'l'he eourt further ::mid: 
"rrhe right to regulate and control a puhlie 
utility exiRtH because wch utility affectR the 
public intereRtR. Under the common law a utility 
had no right to a monopoly, and, to ilw extent 
that it now posseRReR Rw~h righiR in a limited 
degn~e, it traceR Ruch rights to the statute. If 
the services rendered by a company are of a 
public nature, they come ipso fado mtder the 
jurisdiction of the commission for administrativP 
purposes. Tf i 11 the operation of their business 
they perform services to or for the puhli(~ in tlw 
field of public utilities, they are in law and in 
fact public utilities, and, at least to the extent that 
they serve the pnblie, the eommiRsion haH juris-
diction over them for regulation and eontrol pur-
poses.'' 
In the case of State vs. Department of Publir: W Mks 
(Wash). 291 Pae. :346, the court had before it the queH-
tion of the status of a water company as a public utility. 
'l'he facts in that case were that in the year 1909 Lindsay 
and Lenhart purchased certain land in Snohomish 
county. They plotted it into tracts calling the plat 
F'ruitdale-on-the-Sound. For the purpose of improving 
the property they acquired a supply of water and es-
tablished waterworks and system by which water was 
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delivered to the owners of the several tracts as needed 
for agricultural and (lomestic purposes. 'l'he water 
system continued in mutual ownership until l~Jl9 at 
whic-h time the owners orga nir.ed a corporation known 
as the Fruitdale-on-tlw-Souwl. 'l'he corporation acquired 
the title to the water system from the owners of the 
property ill lot three issuing part of its capital stock, 
and has at all times siiJce, operated improved, and ex-
tended Uw water works and services. Some of its 
capital stock was sold to other than the laiHl owners 
within lot three. 'l'he articles provide: "To furnish 
water to people living at Fruitdale-on-the-Sound and 
in the vieiuity located ou lot three.'' Shortly thereafter 
the corporation commeuced to and continued to operate 
water for hire to people outside of the property owned 
origiually by Lindsay and Lenhart, the number of such 
patrons iucreasing from year to year. 'l'he evidence 
shows that shortly after the corporation formed and 
continued thereafter, it received from time to time and 
complied with an increasing number of applicatious 
from parties outside of lot three to he supplied with 
water. Such outside parties built their homes so that 
they could use this water aud with the expenditure of 
$2,000 they had conueeted their several premises with 
the water system of the corporation. 'l'he parties outside 
of lot three had at all times paid for the water they 
received, two different prices to two different classes 
as determiued by the corporation. Indeed, all the costs 
of improvements, mainteuarwe, and operation of the 
waterworks ~were met hy charges collected from the 
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outside consumers, while the consumers inside had gotten 
and continued to receive water free. The court said: 
"Appellants say, as we understand, that be-
cause the water company has charged different 
rates to those who pay ami at the same time furn-
ished its stockholders whose property is located 
within lot 3 with free water, and that those on 
the outside who pay have agreed to do so by pri-
vate contracts, therefore it is not a public service 
corporation and that it has never intended to hold 
itself out as a public utility. But those things 
are not the test by which its status is to be de-
termined. In State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works 
v. Higgins, et al, (Wash), 28:1 Pac. 1074, 1075, 
the parties against whom the department of public 
works proceeded contended that they were not 
engaged in a public serYice but private business 
only, and hence did not come uncler the public 
service act. But this court held otherwise and 
in its opinion, upon referring to and quoting 
from the case of Cusking vs. White, 101 Wash. 
172, 172 Pac, said that such eases must be de-
termined by the character of the business actually 
carried on by the carrier, and not by any secret 
intention or mental reservation it may entertain 
or assert when charged with the duties and obli-
gations which the law imposes. 
'"rhe case of Terminal Taxicab Co. vs. Kutz, 
241 U. S. 252 is to the same general effect. In 
that ease the taxicab company sued to restrain 
the publie utilities commissiou from assuming 
jurisdiction over the business or the taxicab 
company. 'rlw court upon stating that tho articles 
of incorporation of the taxicab company with 
copius verbiage authorized tho corporation to 
build, buy, sell, lot, and operate automobiles, 
taxicabs, awl other vohieles, but nut to exercise 
any of the pov\·ers of a public service corporation 
said: 'It does bus£ne:-;s in the di:-;trict and the im-
portant thing is what it does, not what its charter 
says.' '' 
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It must be hold to be pretty well settled in this 
State that no corporation or other person actually 
engaged as a public utility can, hy the simple device of 
entering into contracts with ih; eustomers and patrons, 
prevent the commencement of the exercise of the state's 
control or withdraw itself from that control while so 
engaged. (See Utah Co1Jper Co. rs. Public Utilities Com-
mission of Utah, 203 Pac. 627). 
At this point it is well to inquire as to the actual 
purpose of the Garkane Company with respect to 
service. of electrical energy in the territory served by it. 
It is apparent from the Articles of Incorporation that it 
intends to serve everyone in that territory who will be-
come a member of the corporation. That is made evident 
by the provision that the original incorporators pay 
$3.00, and the later members or stockholders pay $10.00, 
the provision bei11g plain tlwt the others are to be 
added to the corporation as stocklwlclers as time goes 
on and as the facilities permit. It also appears that the 
company is borrowing vublic money to build the plant, 
and that the more eustomen;, patrons, or rate payers 
it contains, the quicker that debt can be paid off, and 
the more certain will he the security for the payment of 
the loan. There is nothing in the articles which sug-
guests that the eompmty is going to stop at any given 
figure as to the number of patrons to be served. As 
a matter of fact, it appears that the company already 
has stockholders of about 600 in number. 'rhat is a 
considerable segment of the public - it is probably 
all of the public who are able, in the territory proposed 
to be served by the company, to buy electrical service. 
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It is certain that the company, being authorized to 
sell electrical equipment, is going to sell equipment 
to promote the use of its energy. If a corporation de-
sired to get the service of electrical energy would the 
company refuse that service wl!ere such energy could 
be had and the payment for it sure. In line with the 
cases quoted above it appears thai it chooses to serve the 
public, within that territory to he served by the company. 
It will not serve everyone in the State of Utah, nor every-
one in Garfield or Kane counties, but it will serve all 
those who desire to purchase electrical energy and who 
can be connected to the line within the territory to be 
served by this eompauy. As a matter of fact no common 
carrier serves all the public. 'l'he Utah Power & Light 
Company does not serve everyone in the State of Utah, 
nor everyone within its own territory. 
In 18 Arn. J"ur. Sec. 24, p. 425 it is said, 
''The conflicting results of the decisions 
make it impossible to lay down a general rule as 
to whether the remleriug of incidental service to 
members of the public hy au individual, or a cor-
poration, whose busines:,; principally is of a dif-
ferent nature constitutes :,;uch person a public 
utility. T'his q ue:,;tion depends on such factors as 
the extent of the service, whether such person has 
held himself or itself out as ready to serve the 
public generally --- at least within a certain area 
- or in other ways coudueied himself or itself 
is a public utility. In :,;everal eases it has been 
held that a person supplyiug electricity to others 
as ineiueutal to his mai11 lmsines:,; is not :,;o en-
gaged as to Le constituteu a public utility. There 
are, however, other decisions iu which the inei-
dental :,;ervice has been heid to be of such a nature 
35 
that it was subject to public regulation and con-
trol." (See also [( ettcnhofen vs. Globe Transfer 
and Storage Co. 127 Pac. 295.) 
The courts have frequently had before them the 
task of determining the status of a corporation with 
relation to the jurisdiction of public service commissions. 
In deciding the question as to when the corporation 
becomes effected with a public interest, the courts have 
reached various conclusions. It will be the purpose of 
this Brief to point out some leading eases on this sub-
ject pertaining to various types of public service. 
In the case of Hotel Pfister, Inc. vs. Wisconsin 
Telephone Co. 233 N.W. 617, the court was concerned 
with a matter of an injunction to restrain the telephone 
company from shutting off telephoue connections with 
the hotel, as the telephone company threatened to do, 
unless the plaintiff should reinstate a five-cent rate 
formerly charged for a ten-cent rate recently estab-
lished by the plaintiff aml charged against rooms of 
guests for phone calls made from rooms to persons 
outside the hotel. 'fhe trial court dismissed the com-
plaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed it. 
The court after deciding other questions had this 
to say: 
'' 'fhe plaintiff contends that the defendant 
has no right to disconnect its system from the 
hotel because the hotel is not a public utility, and 
the Railroad Commission is therefore without 
power to regulate the charge for the service 
the hotel renders to its guests over its private 
system. J t is quite true, of course, that the hotel 
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is not a publi<' utility. But, even so, it may like 
any other corporation or private person be the 
agent of the <~ompany hy aiding it to perform its 
service to the public. The reeital in tho eontract 
that the payment:-; hy tlw eompany to Uw hotel 
an' 'aH eommi:-;sion' lH'il rs out this idea of the 
relations between the parties. 'l'ho commiHsion 
only eoneerns i1Helf with the public telephone 
servieo performed by the hotel, as distinguished 
from the t->erviec to iiH guests performed through 
its priYntc system. Then· is no attempt to reg-
ulate the dmrge Uw ltohd may make to its guests 
for tho iutra-lwtol Hervieo it performs for them. 
It may dwrgo and collcd for this Horviee by add-
ing to itt-> room t•hargo to guests for tho intra-
hotel smTiee it performs for them. It may charge 
and colled for this service by adding to its room 
ehargo io gueHts or hy making a charge for every 
call from one room to another within the hotel." 
A careful reading of this ease discloses the position 
the Garkmw Company desires to take here. This com-
pany would have us say that its responsibility to the 
public terminates when the power is delivered to a 
consumer, user, or stoeklwlder of tho company. But 
what about tho patrons of other power companies who 
are already serving part of the public in the State of 
Utah"? What of other t•ompanies who might desire to 
enter this field"? If ,.;orne private eompany should seeure 
a oertifieate of eonvenienee and noeessity from the Public 
Service Uommit>sion, am! tlw Garkaue Company eon-
tending it needed 1 hem were fu ruishing tho serviee with-
out a eortificate, the gclleral publie would eortainly 
be the sufferer beeause eertHin of the puhlie might desire 
to patronize the company lwviug the eertificato, and 
certain of the public might de::-;in• to patronize tho Gar-




which would be costly to all the rate payers. It might 
even result in bankruptcy to one or the other of the 
companies. It might result then in a failure of the 
service, and after all the continuity of service is the 
primary duty of the Public Service Commission. The 
Garkane Company could not contend that they were 
the only ones entitled to service in that territory as they 
had no certificate of convenience and necessity. Any 
company might enter the field if it were granted a 
certificate. If the Garkane Company contended, as 
it does now, that it was a private corporation not serv-
ing the public there would be no objection to the granting 
of a certificate of convenience and necessity to the other 
company. But would there7 Wouldn't we have the 
Garkane Power Company then contending that the 
granting of such certificate would be ruinous to it as 
it would tend to attract customers of the Garkane Power 
Company1 A rate war might develop. Both companies 
might be wiped out. The farms then would be left with 
the equipment and electrical appliances which had been 
sold them by the Garkane Power Company, and with no 
electrical energy with which to operate them. 
No, I think, it is apparent that the prima.ry interest 
here is the public. When a company such as the Garkane 
Power Company undertakes to serve such a large seg-
ment of that public as this company contemplates serv-
ing, it becomes so affected with a public interest that it 
cannot be said that the state loses all power to regulate 
it. The words "for public service" in Section 76-2-1 
(20) supra, cannot be read as though it meant "service 
38 
to all of the public." They mm;t he read in view of the 
context of the ad and general purposes of the aet. 
THE FAcrp rrHAT THE COMPANY IS A MUTUAL 
COMPANY SHOULD NOrr BF~ COWfROLLJNG 
.Just heca use the Gar kane Company chooses to ren-
der its public service to tho:,;e who have subscribed, or 
will subscribe, to shares of stock in its corporation, 
does not render the S(~rvice :,;upplied any le:,;:,; a public 
:,;ervice. 
This reasoning IS supported hy the eases. 
In the case of City of Chicago vs. Alton Railroad 
Co., 355 Ill. p. 65: 
''The purpose of the Pubic Utilities Act is 
to bring under the control of the public, for the 
common good, property applied to public use m 
which t!1e public has an interest. * * * '' 
Palmyra Telephone Co. vs. Modesto Telephone Co., 
:136 Ill. 158 : 
''Also to establish and to protect public util-
ities in their respective fields from destructive 
eompeti ti on.'' 
Chicago Railways 11.'1. Commerce Commission, 3:36 
Ill. 51 : 
'' rrhe Act contemplates actual supervision of 
every public utility r,;o that adequate, uniform, 
and satisfactory service should be remedied to 
the public at reasonable rates and without dis-
crimination.'' 
In the ease of Palmyra 11s. Modrosto Co., supra, the 
court determined what constituted a public use so as to 
bring a corporation within the jurisdiction of the public 
utilities eommtsson: 
'"l'o constitute a public use all persons must 
have equal right to use the utility all(l it must he 
in common and upon the same terms, however 
few the number wl10 avail themselves of it. 'l'he 
use must eoitel'rll the public as distinguished 
from an individual or any particular number of 
imli\'iduals, hut tlte use :wd enjoyment of the 
utility need not exte11d to the whole public or 
political subdivision. Such use may be confined 
to a particular district and will be publie.'' 
In the case of Celina & Mercer County Telephone 
Company vs. Union-Center ftfutual Telephone Associa-
tion, 133 N.E~. G40 (Ohio), 21 A.L.R. 1145, the decision 
was based upon a situation where the Mutual Company 
eoutemled that it \vould eonfine its business to inter-
communication between members, and that while it 
proposed to construct and operate a telephone plant, 
and to usc tlte public streets of the village under ac-
cepted franehises, aud to usc the public highways, that 
it was nothing more than a mutual partnership asso-
ciation organized not for profit. The Court said: 
"It elaims the right to do so, first, for the 
reason that, !Je<·a use of the character of its or-
galli!';ation aml its proposed method of engaging 
in tlw telephone business, the Public Utility Aet 
does not apply to it; * * * " 
rrhe statute involved in the ease provilled that the 
term "publie utility" sl10uld mean and include every 
corporation, company, eopartnen.;hip, person or asso-
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ciation, lessee, trustee, or reemvers, defined in the next 
preceding section, except such public utilities as operate 
their utilities not for profit, and except such public 
utilities as are or may hereafter he owned or operated 
by any municipality, aml except such utilities as are 
defined as railroads. 'l'he Court held that the company 
was a public utility, and said: 
''As a public utility the defendant comes 
under the jurisdiciion of the Public Utilities Act, 
unless it i8 taken out nuder one of the three 
exceptions mentioned in Art. 614-2a. Two of 
these exeeptio11s have llO application whatever 
to the defendant, aml may be discarded, as it 
is not a railroad or a municipally owned or oper-
ated utility. 'l'hc next question, then, is whether 
or not it is a public utility operated 'not for 
profit.' How may it he determiued whether a 
corporation or a8soeiation is one for profit, or 
not for profit? Does the filing of articles of 
incorporation in which the declaration is made 
that it i8 uot for profit, a11d ou which the charter 
is issued, goveru or determiue this question'~ Is 
the issuance or Holli8sUaJwe of capital stock con-
trolliug, or is it whether a busiucss is to be 
engaged in and operated with eousideratiou of the 
character of thai business, and the method of cou-
duetiug it, that is the true test"? 
"We think the latter. Seetiou 8667 General 
Code provides: 'If a corporation be organized for 
profit, it must have a capital stock.' 
''lt is held iu Suyder u. Findlay Chamber of 
Cmn:merce, ;.>:J Ohio St. 1, 41 NJ£. :-33, that the 
declaration iu the articles of iucorporation that 
it is formed not for profit is uot ineousistent 
with a provision for capital stock. lu other 
words, it is the dwrader of tht> business and 
Llw method of cmHlueting thaL lmsiuess that eou-
trol. 
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"A corporation then, organized for profit, 
providing no capital stock whatsoever, under cer-
tain circumstances, may be in fact conducting a 
business for profit. A partnership association, 
for the same reason, although having no capital 
stock, when engaging in a business, may and 
usually is engaging in that business for profit. 
''Here is a company calling itself a partner-
ship association, but found to be a telephone 
company as that term is used in the Public 
Utilities Act, and because it is a telephone com-
pany it is, under the same definition, also a com-
mon carrier, with all the responsibilities and 
burdens which that term involves, engaging in 
the business of carrying messages, news, and in-
formation, found to be a public utility, having 
the right to the use of the public streets by fran-
chise grant, for the purpose, as announced in the 
franchise ordinance itself, of supplying the citi-
zens of the village and the public with communi-
cation by telephone, and at the same time char-
tered and claiming to be a company not for profit. 
"In our opinion, this claim is no more than 
a legal conclusion, and totally at odds with what 
the company has done, and what under its own 
claims it contemplates doing. It says it does not 
contemplate connecting with other services for 
long-distance or toll service 'for the present.' 
Certainly not. The telephone plant :was not 
erected or in operation. What it would do when 
the plant was erected and the business of the 
company in full operation is very easy to 
contemplate. As a telephone company, engaging 
in the business of transmitting telephonic mes-
sages for the benefit of the public and the citizens 
of the vicinity, it would have to furnish facilities 
for transmitting those messages to the outside 
world for the benefit of that public and those 
citizens, because that service is fundamentally 
the thing for which it holds an excuse for ex-
istence. 
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"vVe believe that taking into aecount the 
various representations made by this defendant 
iu its stat(~mentR ami admissious, and applying 
Rtatutory rules of law made applicable to that 
Ri1uation ami condition, that this eompany, from 
the very nature of its organization and existm]('e, 
is a public telephone company, a utility, and a 
common carrier, and, ('OliRidering the nature and 
character of the business which it must engage in 
with the public as its patron, that Rueh a lmsinesR, 
uo matter what the pretciJRe may he, no matter 
what claimR are advanced, in its very natun~, 
eannot he one operated, in the true senRe of the 
1 erm, 'uot for profit.' " 
Our Rtatute does not exempt mutual eompamPs. A 
reading of most of the eaRcs cited by plaintiff will dis-
elose that the eases were decided upon statutes very dis-
similar to ourR. See Sullwold L'S. Four Lakes Rnral 
Telegraph Co., P.U.R. 1918 B 147; ReFire Mite Crep)r 
Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1918 B 526; Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company us. Pro,jer:t 1J1uiual 
etc., P.U.R.1916 F' :~70; Em.poria vs. Emporia Telephone 
Comany, ~)0 Kans. 118, 1:3:3 Pac. 858; Camp Rincon Re-
sort vs. Eshleman, 172 Cal. 561, lfi8 Pac. 186; See note 
119 A.L.R. ~)85; McMillan vs. Noyes, 72 At!. 759; See 
note 18 A.L.H. 764; Walker vs. Shasta P1ncer Co., 49 
Federal 56, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 725; Nash vs. Clark, 27 
Utah 158, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 208, 75 Pac. :111. 
rrhe ease of Clark vs. Olson, 31 Pac. 2nd 534, D3 
A.L.H. 240, with a note at page 248, contains a discussion 
by the court of the distinguishing faetors which mark 
a dedieation of property to a public use. 
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It is the contention of the defendant that the ele-
ments which were not found in the Clark case but which 
were referred to in 93 A.L.R. at p. 246, are the very 
elements which make of the Garkane Company a com-
pany which has devoted its property to such public use 
that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Commission 
under the purview of the statutes of the State of Utah. 
In the case of Rockingham County Light and Power 
Company vs. Hobbs, 66 L.R.A. 58, 58 Atl. 46, it was said 
by the court: 
"If the plaintiff is under obligation to supply 
electricity or electric energy at reasonable rates, 
and without discrimination, to all corporations, 
public, quasi public, and private, and to all 
persons desiring it, who are located within rea-
sonable distances of the plaintiff's lines, so far as 
the extent and capacity of its works will permit, 
it appears to have an the characteristics of a 
quasi public corporation. Its articles of asso-
ciation do not, in terms, impose this obligation 
upon it. They are, however, entirely consistent 
with the existence of the obligation. When the 
interpretation is considered which the plaintiff 
has given to the agreement by its acts in locating 
lines of wires in the public highways, and in pro-
curing and attempting to exercise the right of 
eminent domain, it is apparent that the plaintiff 
intended by its articles of association to take upon 
itself the obligations of a quasi public corpora-
tion in respect to the sale of electricity and elec-
tric energy. The delegation of the power of em-
inent domain to a corporation is not always 
accompanied with an express imposition of the 
obligation to serve the public reasonably and 
equitably. A corporation, by the acceptance and 
exercise of the power, impliedly undertakes such 
service respecting the subject for which the power 
is exercised.'' 
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Soc JVinegrove vs. PulJlir: 8 erviN~ Commission, L.R.A. 
1918 A 210, note 21 3; 81 S.E. 734. 
Tn tho cmw of J>ionPPr Telephone & Telegra]Jh Co. 
'I'S. State, et al, 144 Pae. 10()0 (Okla.), it was dt~n~1otJed 
that in October, 1905, defendant, Pioneer Telephone & 
'l1 eleplwne Co., entered into a eoutraet with complainants, 
the State a1Hl Cherokee Hural 'relephone Co., whereby 
it was agreed that when complainants constructed their 
telephone line to the edge of the town of Cherokee, de-
fendallt would cormeet said line to its exchange at Clwr-
okee; that the rural Rubserihers of eomplaimmts should 
have free nRc of defendant's exchange at Cherokee OY<'l' 
all rural telephone linPs for six months, and tlwrnafter 
c-omplainants' subscribers should he required to pay 
26 eents per month per teleplwne, with a minimum charge 
of $1.50 per month for each rural line, and a maximum 
charge of $5.00; that said party line suhRerihers Rhould 
have free use of defendant's exehauge over the rural 
lines; that defendant should give the rural subscribers 
or any other rural eompany connected with the exchange 
of defendant at Cherokee the uRe of said lines without 
charge. Complainants further allege that the farmers, 
or party line subscribers are permitted to use, free of 
charge, the "clear wires" <·mmeded with the Cherokee 
exchange betwee11 the towns of Lambert, Cherokee, 
Driftwood, lngerRoll, Byro11, and Amorita, where plain-
tiff in error has an exchange; that complainants' sub-
scribers, living in the town of Lambert are permitted 
to talk with defendant's subscribers living in the town of 
Uherokee, without paying the usual fee for said serviee::;, 
although complainants maintain a elear wire between 
said towns; that complainants' subscribers are stock-
holders in said rural companies connected with defend-
ant's exchange. Complainants further allege that because 
some of their subscribers are residents of said towns 
and stockholders in said mutual companies, they should 
also be permitted to use the clear wires. of the mutual 
companies for long-distance messages, but instead, de-
fendant routes their messages over its own clear wire 
between said towns, and charges the usual long distance 
fee therefore; whereas the rural or party line sub-
scribers are permitted to use said clear wires of the 
mutual companies free of charge between said towns. 
Complainants further allege that defendant is discrim-
inating between its subscribers residing in towns and 
what are known as ''rural subscribers,'' and a prayer 
was made that the order of the Corporation Commission 
may issue, compelling defendant to furnish the inhabi-
tants of said towns with free long-distance services over 
the rural lines of said mutual companies connecting with 
defendant's exchange at Cherokee. The Pioneer Com-
pany filed a general denial and challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the commission for the reason that complainants 
are mutual companies, not operated for hire, so as to 
bring them within the purview of said section of the 
Constitution; and the rural or party line subscribers 
were permitted to talk to any other rural or party line 
subscribers to any other town connected with the ex-
change of defendant, except where the parties are resi-
dents of the towns in which case defendant claims it is 
entitled to the usual long-distance fee for services over 
its clear wire. 
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"It appears from the evidence introduced 
before the Commission that the Cherokee Tele-
phone Company, Byron Mutual Telephone Com-
pany, Amorita 'l'elephone Company, and the 
Citizens' 'l'elephone Company, at Driftwood, 
which has an exchange eonneeting the towns of 
Carmen, Dacoma, awl Cherokee, are mutual com-
panies; that the lines were built by the farmers 
and business men of the towns included therein; 
that they own their own exchanges at the towns 
of Ingersoll and Driftwood, aml own what is 
known as a 'clear wire' from saicl towns to the 
city of Cherokee; that as a rule, each person, in 
order to he given the services of a telephone, was 
requireJ to buy stock in said mutual companies; 
and that all persons having the use of telephones 
were member8 of the rural companies. It further 
appears from the evidence that the Pioneer 
Telephone & 'l'elegra ph Company owns the ex-
change at Cherokee, and also own a long-distance 
line, or dear wire, eonuecting all the towns above 
mentioneJ; that dcfcmlaut transmits said mes-
sages over the community clear wire, when re-
quested by rural subseriben.;, but when a person, 
say in Amorita, wishes to talk to a man in Chero-
kee, he is required to pay the usual long-distance 
fee; whereas, Lhe nn-al subscriber, as above 
stated, ean talk free between said towns, and the 
message is routed over the lines of said mutual 
companies. 
''It is the contention of defendant that, inas-
mueh a:,; the reconl shows that the eomplainants 
are mutual companies and some of the officers 
of tho8e eompauie8 testified they were not oper-
ated for l1ire, the CommiBsion had no jurisJiction 
over ::.;ueh ('OmpunieB, ami thu8 was without au-
thority to make Uw ordcr8 complained of. In our 
opinion, this ('Outcuiion is uot sound. While the 
record shows complaiwmt companies are mutual 
companies, and 1'1 r. Rather, President of the 
Byron Mutual 'l'elephone Company, testified that 
his company was not operateJ for hire, yet the 
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very nature of the business in which these com-
panies are engaged, as shown from the record 
each owning and operating a number of miles of 
telephone lines, with a large number of sub-
scribers, who contribute for the purpose of erect-
ing and keeping up the expense in operating said 
lines, and the further fact that it is shown from 
the record that in their intercourse with defendant 
company they receive a certain per cent from 
that company for services rendered, shows beyond 
question that these companies, while mutual com-
panies, were organized and are operated for hire, 
within the purview of Section 5, Article 9, Con-
stitution. To hold otherwise throughout this state 
on the plan of mutual companies, and in effect 
control the larger part of the telephone business 
in the state, and yet could operate unregulated 
and without any restraint of any kind. In our 
judgment this was not contemplated by the Con-
stitution. The term 'mutual companies' is not 
necessarily synonymous with the term 'without 
hire'. " 
It will be seen from the case cited that a mutual 
telephone company where each of the parties own stock 
is not withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission, and the reasons given by the court 
are that the service to the public necessitates public 
regulation. The relation of the subscriber to the com-
pany was not the concern of the court but rather the 
service to the patron of the company whether he was a 
stockholder or not. 
In the case of Vale our vs. Village of Morrisville 
found in 2 Atl. 2d. 312, the court had before it the statute 
which reads as follows: 
''A person, association, company or corpora-
tion- engaged -in the business of generating in this 
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state electric energy and distributing the same 
for general sale for heating, lighting or power 
purposes or for any other public use, if and when 
requested so to do, at all reasmwble times, shall 
sell and distribute the same to auy and all persons 
'"' '"' " that desire to use the same within this state 
for either or any of sueh purposes; subject, how-
ever, to sud1 reasonablt> limitations as to the 
amount of energy to be furnished a purchaser, 
and which shall in 110 ease lw beyond what is 
reasonably uecessary, aml also as to the distance 
from the generatiug plant or from its lines of 
transmission that sueh energy shall he delivered." 
Under certain sections jurisdiction in such matters 
IS giVen to the Public Service Commission. The court 
said: 
"Petitionee is a municipal corporation and 
operates au elcdric utility within the corporation 
limits and distributes and sells electric energy 
outside these limits. 'L'lw petitioner owns and re-
sides upou a farm in Stocw uot far from peti-
tionee's high tension line conveying curreut to the 
electrical department of the village of Stowe. 
Prior to Augm;t 10, 1930, the petitionee was 
delivering eurrent to said farm. On that elate the 
barn upon said farm was destroyed by a fire, 
which was attributed to the uegligenec of the 
petitionee in the delivery of such current. See 
Valcour u. Village of Morrisville, 104 Vt. 119, 
158 A. 8:3. Since the fire, although requested, the 
petitionee has refused to supply current to the 
petitioner. 'l'his is a proceeding to eompel the 
petitionee to supply t-md1 eurrent. When this 
case was here before the petition was based upon 
the provisious of P. L. 64;j2 and 6453, but in 
affording the rl'lief prayed for the public serviee 
eommission, after making findings of fact, the 
subRtanee of which is given in the support of that 
case, based it~ juri~dietion upon other grounds. 
That order of the eommission was reversed aud 
the cause was remanded. 
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''Doubtless prompted hy a suggestion in the 
opinion of that ease, to whic·h we will later refer, 
the petitiouer asked and obtained leave to file an 
amended petition with the commission after the 
remaud. 'l'his amemled petition, partly in addi-
tion to fads formerly alleged, shows that sinee 
the petitionee beeame engaged in the business of 
g0nerating eledrieity in 1895, it haH increased 
the capacity of its plant from 80 horse power to 
upwards of 4,000 horse power, aud now has au 
investment of approximately $600,000.00 aud gen-
erates approximately 5,2GO,OOO kilowatt hours of 
elt>dric energy ammally, ami has uet earnings of 
over $:15,000; that it supplies electricity to tlw 
municipal electric plants of the villages of Stowe, 
ITyde Park, .Johnson and Hardwick for sale to 
their inhabitants; that it supplies all of the elec-
tric energy use(l by upwards of 140 farmers on 
approximately 147 farms outside of the petitionel~ 
village iu the vieini ty of Cady's Falls, Morris-
town Corners, the Laport Road, Elmore Road aud 
village, Handolph Road, ljJimore Mountain Road, 
and in the viciuity of petitionee village, and iu-
eluding ueighhoring farmers located upon both 
sides of the petitioner a]}(l all the farmers using 
electric e11ergy between the villages of .Morris-
town and Stowe, all at uniform rates; that it 
sells, and heretofore has sold, outside of the peti-
tionee village limits more than fifty per cent of 
the eleetrie energy gem~ratcd hy it to the puhlie 
generally, and to all persons, companies, assoeia-
tions and corporations, municipal, public aud pri-
vate that d('sired tl1e same, imliscriminatcly at 
regular rates; that it wholly dominates the terri-
tory eovcred .so Umt other utilities arc prceluded 
from eutcriug- 1 herein as c~ompetitors or to serve 
the petitioner; that it has trausmissiou lines 
and wires extending to sueh huildiug-s; aud that 
within 500 yards of the petitioner's buildings, 
it heretofore has be(m, alld now is, able to supply 
energy to the p<~titioner. rl'he amemlcd petition 
further shows that the <h~velopment of petitionee's 
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plant has ereated a fmrplus which is not, and has 
not been temporary, easual alHl incidental, hut 
that it is far beyond what is or will be required 
to serve the needs of the petitionee village, and 
that although the petitionee ostensibly only sells 
its surplus, it has in reality created a surplus far 
in excess of the needs of the inhabitants of said 
village. 
'"rhe amended petition was demurred to, the 
demurrer was overruled, and the petitionee was 
again ordered to supply electric energy to the 
petitioner upon the same terms and conditions 
whereby it sells sueh energy to eommmers resid-
ing in the vicinity of the petitioner. From this 
order the petitionee hm; appealed. 
''The questions presented for review are 
those raised by the demurrer. rrlw first, third 
and seventh grounds of demurrer are: 
"1. "rhe matters contained in said peti-
tion are res ad.iudicata between the parties 
as appears from the records and files in said 
cause.' 
'' 3. 'Petitioner is estopped by the 
record in this proceeding from asserting 
that petitionee is under duty to serve the 
petitioner as prayed in said petition.' 
"7. 'It appears from the record that the 
Commission is without jurisdiction, right or 
power to grant the relief sought by the peti-
tion.'' 
"As to these grounds it is sufficient to point 
out that when this case was here before we men-
tioned that there were no findings upon certain 
matters, and suggested that a case might be pre-
i:Hmted in which we should determine whether the 
surplus from a municipal utility may or may not 
he devoted to public use without express legis-
lative authority. " " "" 
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'' 'I'lw otlwr grounds of dnmurrer go to the 
meritR, and im;iRt tlwt Ull(]er the law of the cage 
the allegatiom; are immffieient to warraut the 
relief prayed for; that considered in connection 
with the record in tlliR proeeeding they m;tahlit-:h 
that the petitionee is not a public utility at the 
place where petitioner t-:el~ks service; and that 
the petition doeR not allege sueh matters as in 
the~ eireumstmwes of the ease entitle the petitioner 
to the relief prayed for. 
"It is appropriate to quote from Valcour v. 
Villape of Morrist'ille, 104 Vt. 119, 1:31, U2, HiS A. 
8i3, SG, as follmvt-:: 'In acquiring and operating 
any kind of a public utility, a municipal corpora-
tion aetR in itt-: priYate or proprietary, aR dis-
tinguiRhed from itR public or governmental, ea-
paeity, Rim·e the furnishing of water or lights 
to its inhabitants is in no sense a goverumental 
fmwtion. It holds the property comprisiug such 
utility, primarily, for its owu and its inhabitants' 
use. If the operation of the utility for the primary 
objeet for which it is created produces a surplut-: 
of water, light, etc., dietates of common business 
prudeuee require that it be disposed of awl its 
proceedR devoted to the use of the municipality 
or itR inhabitauts. 'J'hat it has the right to dispose 
of such surplus within its corporate limits with-
out special legislative authority we entertain 110 
doubt; and ~we see 110 logical reason why it may 
not likewise dispose of sueh surplus outsiue its 
limits since its right to do so in either case is 
purely iucidenial lo the primary object for which 
it ~was created, and i11 1witl1er is it discharging a 
goyernmental function. vVe hold, therefore, that 
the defundau1 had the right to dit-:pose of itt-> 
t->urplus eluetril'ity outsidt> its own limits and to 
extend its equipmPnt as might be ueeest->ary for 
that purpose.' 'l'lmt l'Hse holds that in sueh opera-
tions the defendant was not acting as a public 
utility, but that its relations with its customers 
were purely eoutraetual, aml that it had no au-
thority as a puhlie utility to operate outside its 
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limits. ln the dc•claration ill that ca:-;e the plain-
tiff :-;oug-ht damage:-; hecau:-;e of the alleg(~d negli-
gmH'(' of tl1e defendant, and the ease came up 011 
a demurrer to the replication, so a ea:-;e :-;uc!J a:-; 
the in:-;tant one wa:-; not pre:-;(~nted. Wlwtlw1· the 
then defendant wa:-; a private ('Ollirador or a 
utility at tlw place in que:-;timl eonld make no 
differenee in the n•:-;ult, all([ the holding that the 
defendant had 110 autl10rity a:-; a publie utility to 
operate outside its limitt> was obiter. Tlw iu:-;taut 
em;e prm;ents a situation in which we :-;lwuld 
examine anew wlwUwr or not this village can 
devote its :-;urplu:-; (o public use outside its limits, 
and if it ha:-; so devott~d it. Unle:-;s it ea11 and lw;; 
it eanuot be compelled to furuish eleetric energy 
to the petitioner under See. 64;)2 or ( ~hapte1· 2;)() 
(Seetiou G084 et seq.) of the Puhlic Laws, for to 
do so would be a vai11 attempt to ('onvert a 
private contrad.or into a puhlie utility. 'l'his case 
in 108 VL 242, 251, 184- A. 881. 
"So fa:-; as here material P. L. G4G2 reads: 
'A person, association, company or corporation 
engaged iu the business of generating in this 
state elcdric energy and distributing the :-;arne for 
general sale for lwating, lighting or pownr pur-
poses or for any other pnblie USl~, if awl wlwH 
n•cpwsted so to do, at all reasouahlt~ times, HlwJJ 
sell and distribute tllt• same to any awl all pt'r-
sons * * * Uwt desire to usc the same within this 
state for either or ally of sueh purposes; subjed, 
however, to suc·h reasonable limitatiom.; as to thu 
amount of em·rgy to ht~ furnisht~d a ptu·elmser, 
and whi(•!J :-;hall in 110 caHe h(~ beyond what iR 
reasonably ne(~essary, a]](l aiRo as to the distan(·e 
from the generatiug plant or from its lines of 
tran:-;missiou that sueh energy shall he deliven'd,' 
de. Under Hees. G45(), and Clwpter 250 of ilw 
Publi(• Laws jurisdiction in sueh mat tPr:-; is given 
to the publie Hervice commission. 
"vVe held in Ruthland llail1ray !Jight & 
Power Co. v. Olare-ndon Prm'er· Co., 8G Vt. 45, 8:~ 
A. 332, 44 L.R.A., N.S., 1204, that in the absence 
of (~barter limitationH, a (~orporation which eu-
gagt)H in tlte huHineHs of generatiug and distrib-
uting eledrie energy for general Hale for power 
purposes devotes its property to a public purpose 
aH mueh m; if it limited itH business to the sale 
of cnrnmt for lighting purpm;es, awl that such 
business is affeeied with a public interest, both as 
regards the law of regulation and the law of 
eminent domain. As stated in the opinion that 
holding puiH all corporations engaged in gener-
ating electricity for general sale into one and 
the same class, without regard to the presence or 
a bsenee of special provisions in their charters 
regulating the co]l(]uet of their business. 
''On page 50, 8:3 A. on page 334 this opinion 
comments upon Prof. Wyman's then recent work 
on Public Service Corporations and says that 
'he makes the whole question of Public usc, or 
what iH the same thing, public calling, depend 
upon ·whether the calling iuvolves a matter of 
public necessity and is monopolistic in character, 
in view of the economic, industrial, and commer-
cial condition of the times. Taking monopoly as 
the criterion by which a given calling is to be 
tested, he determines its character as public or 
private, and elastiifies it aceordingly. He divides 
monopolies into three clasHes: Nat ural, state 
granted, and virtual. And his conclusion is that 
when one engageH in a business which is fairly 
assignable to either of these classes, his business 
becomes affected \Yith a puhlic interest, and the 
rights of the pul>li(• therein may he protected by 
legislative adimt, and the couduct of the business 
regulated aecordingly. 'l'hat a business purely 
private iH not su!Jjc~d to sneh regulations is plain 
enough. It iH oniy when the public has an interest 
in it that it haH any rights to be so protected. Nor 
is the situation changed (aeeording to Prof. 
\Vyman's theory) if that business, for onQ reason 
or anotliQr, heeomQs loeally or temporarily mon-
opolistic, HH where a loeal men~hant for the time 
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being controls the whole available supply of a 
given eommodity, iH Htill a private (mterpriHe, 
and (in the respect now under eonsideratiou) free 
from legiHiative regulation or control. On the 
other hand, a puhlie calling may become locally, 
or temporarily, competitive, as where two rail-
roads come to f-Jerve the Harne territory; hut Huch 
do not thereby lose their eharacter as public 
service corporations, and they remain subject to 
regulation and control.' M tmn, v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113, 24 L. FJd. 77, is cited as based upon this 
theory, and it is sai<l that this theory affordH a 
test of public nRe at the same time, logical, work-
able and satisfactory so far as the matter of 
regulation is concerned. 
"In Munn v. lllinm:s, supra, fl4 U.S. 12G, it 
is said: 'Property docs become elothed with a 
public interest when used in a marmer to make 
it of public consequence, and affect the com-
munity at large. When, therefore, one dc,votes 
his property to a uHe in which the public has au 
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an 
interest in that usc, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the commmt good, to the 
extcmt of the interest he has thus created. He 
may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; 
but, so long as he maintains the use, he must 
submit to the control.' This often cited ca::;c 
corwcnwd the transaeting of busiw~ss as publie 
warehousemen. ln support of the conclusions 
there reached the opinion quotes from a number 
of authorities, including Allnutt 1'. Inglis, 12 J£ast 
527, aml from the extracts therefrom we q note 
the following: By Lord FJI!onhorough: ''l'ltere is 
no doubt that the general principle is favored, 
both in law and in justice, that every man may fix 
what priee be pluase::; upon his own property, 
or the usc of it; hut if for a particular purpose 
the puhlie have a right to rPsort to his premiscH 
and make use of them, and he has a monopoly 
in them for that purpoRc, if he will take the bell-
efit of that monopoly, he must, aH an equivalent, 
perform tht' duty atJnelwd to it on rem;onable 
terms.' And by LeBimw, ,J.: "l'lwn admitting 
tllt~~w warehom.;u:,; to he private property, and 
1 hat tlw eompany might discontinue this appli-
cation of tlll~m or that they might have made what 
tPrms they plea:,;ed in the fir:,;t imdmwe, yet hav-
ing, aR they now have, tltiH monopoly, the qLwRtion 
is, wlwtlwr the warehouse:,; be not private prop-
erty elothed with a puhlie right, and if so, the 
principle of law attat~heR upon them.' 
'"l'lw caRe of N euJ y orlc & Chicago a rain & 
Stock Hxchange 1·. Chimgo Board of Trade, 127 
Ill. 15~1, E) N. K 855, 2 L.R.A. 411, 11 Am. St. Rep. 
107, eitc:,; the quotation first above taken from 
klunn v. Illinois, supra, in :,;upport of itR eon-
elm;ions. In tlmt <'aRe it waR lwld that ilw Chi-
cago Board of rrradt~ cannot after having so 
eondueted its affairs for a long term of yearR 
a:,; to en~ate a :,;laudard market for agrieultnral 
product:,;, and in eonet•rt with telegraph com-
panies built up a system for tho instantaneouH 
and eontiuumm indication of that market, until 
such system has beeome impreRHed with a public 
intere:,;t, be allowed to diserimiuate between 
persons, and say that one Rhall and aHothcr shall 
11ot reeci ve the rna rket n~port s, when all are 
equally willing to eonform to rea:,;onablu rule:,; on 
ihe Ruhjel't and pay for thP informatiou. 
"In ddt>rminillg if a eorporation i:,; a puhlie 
utility the important tlting iR what it does, not 
what itR eharter Ha \"H. Terrnina! Taxir·ab eo. r. 
Kutz, 24-1 11 .f-l. 2:12, ·:w f-l. Ct. 38:1, GO L. I'~d. ~)84, 
Ann. Cas. lHlGD, 7fiG. 
"Under our Rtat ute:,; and the fon~goi11g au-
thorities it is dear that if a private eorporation 
wen~ doing what iR alleged it would he properly 
ela:,;sed as doillg a:,.; husillCHH suhjeet to regulation 
by the puhlie scrviee eommission. We have a ease 
where the petitionee ltm; a virtual monopoly in the 
diRtrihution and Rale of electricity in a large 
part of Lamoille County, and where, if it has the 
power, it haH dedicated its Rurplus to the public 
URe. It generateH itH electricity hy water power 
al\(1 haR more than a temporary !'mrpluR. J1~veu if 
it has overbuilt iR no reason why it should let 
itR surplus power go to waste. vV c. are faced with 
au uummal situation \Vhcre over the years a 
municipality has built up a profitable business in 
selling large quantities of electric energy outside 
its limits, all(l we can see no reasou wl1y this 
large surplus may not he devoted to the public 
use until such time, if ever, that the ueeds of 1 ht> 
inhabitants of tlw municipality require all of the 
electric energy generated. To aRRun· an adeqnal(• 
market for all of its Rm·plus it may have beeu 
good business praetie(~ to supply all who requin~ 
electric energy in this large territory, both for 
the purpoRc of selling a8 mueh energy a8 possible, 
and for the purpo8e of preventing competitors 
from entering the territory and taking lmRim•8s 
which the petitionee was prepared to handle. So 
long as it serYeR all(l monopolizes 1l1is territory 
it should not he permitted to discriminate between 
tl10sc desiring such service. Because it has no 
special legislative authority to dispose of its 
surplus outRide its corporate 1imi1H e11titleR it 
to no special favors. It cannot take the advan-
tages without assuming the liabilities wmally 
inrideni to sueh operations. 
"As further showing thai the petitionee lms 
dedicated iiH surplus to public \IS(~ ouiHide its 
corporal ion limits, the amended rwtitiou altegus 
that tlw petitionee has fumished to the public 
serviee eommissiun iuformatio11 requin:d tllld('l" 
P. L. 6088 eonrerniug the eonditio11, opera1 ion, 
mmwgemeut, expense of mainteWllll'(~ and o p<· ra-
ti(m, eosi of produdion, rates eharged for scrviee 
or for produd, eoutraets, obligationR and finan-
cial standing of the corporation, at \'arious times 
during tlw past ten years or more; that througl1 
its manager it has notified tl1e eommission of tlJC 
happening of aeeidents within the State upon itR 
lines and plant, pursuant to P. L. 6089; that it 
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has complied with P. L. 6100 and filed with the 
commissiou from time 1 o time as required by 
its schedules open to puhlie inspection showiug 
all rates, ineluding joint rates, for any serviee 
performed or auy produet furnished by it within 
the State and as part thereof, filed the rules 
aud regulations that in auy manner effect the 
general public, or rateR eharged or to he charged 
for such service or product; that, as provided by 
P. L. 6102, it has kept and now keeps on file iu 
every station or office where payments are made 
by conRumers or users thereof, open to the public, 
and in such form or places as to be readily ac-
eeRsible to inspection by the public, copies printed 
in plain type of so much of its schedules as the 
commission has deemed necessary; that it has, 
from time to time, applied to the commission for 
permission to construct, maintain and operate 
power lines in order to convey electric energy to 
variouH plaees outside of its limits, to run its 
power lines in the highways and across the high-
ways, to eonnect its power lines with the power 
lines of other villages and public utilities, and 
that it has particularly applied for and reeeived 
permission to construct, maintain, operate and 
connect its power lines and equipment outside its 
limits on six occasions, the places and dates being 
speeifieally enumerated, all between 1918 and 
1928; and also that applications and permits to 
construct and maintain wires in other places out-
side its limits were made and issued from time 
to time. 
"The sed ion of the Public Laws above cited 
are a part of Chapter 250, and their provisions 
only apply to those subjnet to supervision under 
that Chapter. By Sec. i308G, a part of that Chap-
ter, the puhlic service commission is given super-
vision of all these, including municipalities, en-
gaged in the manufacture, distribution or sale 
of electricity directly to the public or to he ulti-
mately used by the public, for lighting, heating or 
power, ineluding supervision of their use and 
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occupancy of the public highways. This section 
further proviJes that in the case of those whose 
prill(•ipal business is other than the mmmfadure, 
distribution or sale of eleetricity direetly to the 
public, or ultimately to he used by the public, for 
lighting, heating, or power, they shall he under 
the supervision of the commission only as to that 
part of their business which has to do with sueh 
manufacture, distribution or sale of electricity. 
So far as the manufaetnre, dist ribntio11 or sale 
of electricity for use within the petiticmee's eor-
porate limits are coneerned, this seeticm given the 
commission supervision, hut if, as it contends, 
it is doing a private business outside, it is not sub-
ject to supervision as to that part of its husiuess. 
Yet, the foregoing allegations are sufficiently 
broad to show that it has treated this part of its 
business as also suhjeet to supervision, allll to 
tend to show it has dedieated that business to 
the pnhlic use. Palenno Land & Wat~er Co. '17. 
Railroad Comm., 11:1 Cal. ;)80, lGO P. 228." 
In this brief it is necessary that the argument 011 
the ph raRe "affected with a publie interest," or, as 
stated by the statutes of the State of Utah, "for public 
st~rvice within this State," or, as stated in another Rub-
section, "where the serviee is performed for the publie 
generally,'' be developed by a reference to cases whieh, 
while not altogether in point, are statements of eourts 
as to the delimitationR of a private business and a lmsi-
ness which is so affected with a public interest that it 
becomes a public utility. 'l'he statute must 
the light of these cases and it has been the 
tlw writer of this brief to g1ve the 
be read m 
purpoRe of 
Court the 
benefit of the reasoning of courts and commissionR 
regarding the definition of similar phrases - or the 
reasoning of courts as to the public service required 
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before a company becomes a public utility and therefore 
under the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission. 
Standing by itself, the phrase, "where the service 
IS performed for the public generally," or the phrase, 
"furnishing electric power for public service within 
this State," cannot mean very much unless the whole 
context is viewed in the light of decisions of courts. 
After all, when is a service performed to the public 
generally? When is electrical power furnished for public 
service within this State 7 One of the ways to arrive 
at the answer to these questions is by taking the reason-
ing of cases which have been decided by judges who were 
faced with the question of determining wheu a business 
became so affected with the public interest that it 
ceased to be a private business and was subject to 
regulation. Therefore, at the risk of making this un-
duly prolix I am going to continue to cite eases which 
bear upon this subject. 
A case which bears upon the reasoning of a business 
so affected with a public interest that it ceases to be 
private and becomes subject to the jurisdiction of a 
regulatory commission, is the case of United States v. 
Ohio Oil, found at 234 U.S. 546, 58 L. Eel. 1459. Mr. 
Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court and 
stated the facts to be that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission had issued an order requiring the Ohio Oil 
Company to file with the Commission schedules of rates 
and charges and the company brought suit to set aside 
and annul the order, and he further said: 
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''The circumstances in which the amendment 
was passed are known to everyone. The Standard 
Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation, owned 
the stock of the New York Transit Company, a 
pipe line made a common carrier by the laws of 
New York, and of the National Transit Company, 
a Pennsylvania corporation of like character, 
and by these it connected the Appalachian oil 
field with its refineries in the east. It owned 
nearly all the stock of the Ohio Oil Company, 
which connected the Lima-Indiana field with its 
system; and the National Transit Company, con-
trolled by it, owned nearly all the stock of the 
Prairie Oil & Gas Company, which ran from the 
mid-continent field in Oklahoma and Kansas and 
the Caddo field in Louisiana to Indiana, and con-
nected with the previously mentioned lines. It 
also was largely interested in the Tide Water 
Pipe Company, Limited, which connected with 
the Appalachian and other fields and pursued the 
methods of the Standard Oil Company about to 
be described. By the before-mentioned and sub-
ordinate lines the Standard Oil Company has 
made itself master of the only practicable oil 
transportation between the oil fields east of 
California and the Atlantic ocean, and carried 
much the greater part of the oil between those 
points. Before the recent dissolution, the New 
York and Pennsylvania companies had extended 
their lines into New Jersey and Maryland to 
the refineries, and the laws of those states did 
not require them to be common carriers. To 
meet the present amendment the Standard Oil 
Company took a conveyance of the New Jersey 
and Maryland lines, and the common carrier 
lines now end at insignificant places where there 
are neither market nor appliances except those of 
the Standard Oil, by which it would seem that 
the whole transport of the carriers' lines is 
received. There is what seems to be merely a 
formal breach of continuity when the carriers' 
61 
pipes stop. The chaugc is not material to our view 
of the case. 
"Availing itself of its monopoly of the means 
of transportation the Standard Oil Company re-
fused through its subordinates, to carry any oil 
unless the same was sold to it or to them, awl 
through them to it, on ierms more or less dic-
tated by itself. ln this way it made itself master 
of the fields without the necessity of <nvuing them, 
and carried aeross half the continent a great 
subject of international rommerce coming from 
many o\vners, but, by ihc duress of which the 
Standanl Oil Company was master, carrying it all 
as its own. 'l'he main question is whether the 
act docs and constitutionally can apply to the 
several constituents that then had been united 
into a single line. 
'' 'l'aking up first the construction of the 
statute, we think it plain that it was intended 
to reach the combination of pipe lines that we 
have described. 'l'he provisions of the act are 
to apply to any person engaged in the trans-
portation of oil hy means of pipe lines. 'l'he 
words 'who shall be considered and held to be 
common carriers within Uw meaning and pur-
pose of this act' o 1JViously are uot intended to 
cut dowu the generality of the previous declara-
tion to the meaning that only those shall be held 
commou carriers within the act who were common 
carriers in a techuical sense, but an injunction 
that those iu control of pipe lines and engaged 
in the transportation of oil shall be dealt with 
as such. If the Stawlard Oil Company and its 
cooperating companies were not so engaged no 
one was. lt not only \Vould be a ~mcrificc of fact 
to form, but would empty the act if the carriage 
to the seaboard of nearly all the oil cast of 
California were held not to be transportation 
within its meaning, because of the exercise of 
their power the carriers imposed as a condition 
to ihe carriage a sale to themselves.'' 
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As a matter of fact, courts have always been 
troubled since the Munn decision, with the line of demar-
cation between a private and public business, and yet 
out of the decisions have come certain rules which are 
guideposts and to which we can now turn with some 
degree of assurance. 
As an example of that, I cite the case of Davis v. 
Public Utilities Commission, a Colorado case found at 
247 Pac. 801. There was an action to prohibit the de-
fendant Davis from operating as a common carrier 
without procurring from the Public Utilities Commission 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The 
facts were that Davis was engaged in the transportation 
of freight of all kinds between Grand Junction and 
Paonia, and intervening points. His purported employer 
was the Delta County Merchants' and Manufacturing 
Association. Its 121 members were the shippers of 
more than 90% of the freight carried in that territory. 
This freighting was carried on by means of automobile 
trucks; the number depending upon the volume of busi-
ness. These and all other equipment were owned by 
defendant. He had formerly freighted for many of his 
present patrons, and had applied to the commission for 
a certificate, which was refused. He solicited the mem-
berships and organized the association. He and his 
associates represented that the organization was nec-
essary to enable him to continue business. It held 
no meetings save the one for organization. Its presi-
dent had presided 15 minutes, had never appointed any 
committees, and did not know who were the members 
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thereof, or who was the vice presidPnt. The membership 
fee was $1.00, which few paid. Defewlant had a eontraet 
\Vith the association, binding him to haul for those only 
who belouged to it, bnt accepted shipments from non-
members, and viee versa, on the order and payment of 
either. He maintained a storage and transfer station 
at Delta, insured the goods transported, charged reg-
ular freight rates, based on weight and mileage (charges 
being paid by individual shippers, uot the association), 
accepted freight C.O.D., and carried indemnity msur-
ance to proteet his patrons. 'l'he eourt said: 
"Contrary to popular opiniou, mere sehemes 
to evade law, ouce their true character is estab-
lislwd, arc importaut for the purpose intended. 
Courts sweep them aside as so much rubbish. 
''In detcrming whether a business is that of a 
common carrier, -'the important thing is what 
it does, not what its (•harter says.' Terminal 
Ta:x:icab Co. u. Kutz, et al, 241 U.S. 232, GO L. 
Ed. 984, etc. A service may effect 'so considerable 
a fraetion of the public that it is public in the 
same sense in which any other may be called 
so * * * 'l'he public does not mean everybody all 
the time.' ld. 
"Had defell<lnut made all save one of the 
shippers of freight i11 that territory, or all pur-
chasers of postage at any post office therein, 
members of the m;so(•iatiou, aud claimed that such 
limitation eouverted an otherwise public into a 
private eaninr, tlw <'ontention would be so absurd 
as to be iustantly rejected. But the reasons for 
that rejeetiou would he the identieal reasons which 
demand rejection of defelHlant 's contention, in the 
instant ease: (a) 'l'he proportion of the public 
served is so large as to he the public; (b) the limi-
ta iion is a mm·p d0vice to hoodwink the Jaw.'' 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in the case of 
Southern Oklahoma Power Company v. the Corporation 
Commission, 220 Pac. 370, had to determine whether a 
plant engaged in the manufacture of electrical energy 
which it furnished under contract at the switchboard 
at its plant to a public utility which is engaged in the 
business of transmitting and distributing current to 
the various cities in the State is a public utility and as 
such is subject to the control of the Corporation Com-
mission of this state. The company is a corporation 
under the laws of the State of Oklahoma. It owns and 
operates an electrical plant located at Byng and is en-
gaged in generating electric current, the entire output 
of the plant being sold at the switchboard of the South-
ern Oklahoma Power Company to the Oklahoma Light 
& Power Company, under the terms of a twenty-year 
contract. The Oklahoma Light & Power Company is 
engaged in the business of transmitting and distributing 
electrical energy to various towns and cities served by 
it. The statutes of Oklahoma provided that: 
'' rrhe term 'public utility,' as used in this act 
shall be taken to mean and include every corpor-
ation, association, etc., except towns, etc., that 
now or hereafter may own, operate, or manage 
any plant or equipment or any part thereof 
directly or indirectly for public use, or may sup-
ply any commodity to be furnished to the public 
" " * for the production, transmission, etc., furn-
ishing electrical current for light, heat or power." 
The court said, in deciding this case: 
'' rrhe plaintiff in error contends that the 
Southern Oklahoma Power Company does not 
hold itself out to the public as furnishing power 
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or electricity; that it simply furnishes electricity 
to one public utility uuder private contract; 
that this is simply a case of a private corporation 
furuishing a public utility with a commodity 
which the latter iu turu distributes for public 
use; and that tlw element is lackiug which would 
determiue that that is a public utility, viz. the 
impresRion of its service with a public use. 
"lt is our opiniou that the statutory defini-
tion of a public utility is sufficiently broad to 
inelude a plaut operated as the plant of the 
plaintiff in error, where it generates electricity 
aud furnishes same under a contract to a public 
utility for distribution to the public. 'rhi:,; cor-
poration operates a plant which furnishes and 
supplies a commodity ( t~lectrie energy) to be 
furllished to the public for the production of 
eledric current for light, heat, ami power. 'l'lw 
Rtatute doeR not require that the corporation 
furnish the commodity to the public, but, if it 
furuishes a commodity for the purpose of that 
commodity being delivered to the public for the 
production of light, heat, or power, it comes 
within the statutory definition. It is our opinion 
that the statute impresses the service rendered 
by this corporation with a public uRe. 
''Plaintiff in error contends further that 
the corporation is Itot a puhlie utility beeauRe 
it does not profes:,; to serve the public, am] he-
cause its charter provisions do not permit the 
excreise of the fmwtions of a public utility. In 
this ccnmedion it is contended by tlw plaintiff 
in error that in Oklahoma Natwral Gas Co. c. 
CorrJOration Commission, 211 Pac. 401, this court 
held that a corporation slwuld not he required 
to relJ(ler a service outside awl beyond it:,; profes-
:,;ion of servict~, ~md uuder tl1is amwuneement 
the plaintiff in error shoulJ not he held to be a 
public utility, because it does not profess to he 
such. rrhc rule announcement in the above ease 
has no application to the case at bar, as that 
(j() 
case applied to an order requiring the Oklahoma 
Natural Gas Company to give service which it 
had not been giving, and which it did not profess 
to give; whereas, in the instant case, we have 
an attempt to regulate a service which is already 
being rendered. In the instant case the corpora-
tion commission says : 
'' 'The service in which you are engaged, 
and in which you profess to be, constitutes 
you a public utility, and subject to the statu-
tory regulations as such.' 
''No effort is made to require the corpora-
tion to do something which it has not professed; 
but only to regulate the corporation in connec-
tion with the service which it professes and ac-
tually renders. rrhe plaintiff contends that the 
corporation commission is attempting to extend 
its regulatory jurisdiction over a company which 
has never made any dedication of its property to 
a public use, or made any profession of service 
to the public. Such is not the case. The statute 
has prescribed that the very service performed 
by this corporation is a public service, and, when 
the corporation undertakes to and does perform 
that service which the statute has defined to be 
a public service, such action constitutes a dedica-
tion of property to the public use. 
''It is next contended that the charter of 
the company provides that it is incorporated for 
the purpose of building, owning, and operating a 
plant in Pontotoc county to be used for the pur-
pose of manufacturing and selling at the switch-
board of the corporation at its power plant elec-
tric energy, and that it can only exercise the 
rights and powers conferred by its charter, and, 
since its charter does not authorize it to assume 
to serve the public generally, service to the public 
would be ultra vires. It is sufficient to say that 
the charter provision is adequate to authorize 
the corporation to do just what it is doing, to-wit: 
supply and sell to the Oklahoma Light & Power 
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Company eleetrie energy at the switchboard of 
the corporation to be distributed by tlte Oklahoma 
Light & Power Company to the public, and that 
such ads whi('h are authorized to he performed 
by it uudC'r its charter an~ t-meh ads as eoustitute 
the corporation a puhlie utility umler the stat-
ute * * " 
"And in the instant (~ase we are of the 
opinion that the Legislature intended, and iu plain 
terms provided, for tliC control of the corpora-
tion eommi:,;siou of all plaut::; prodtwing electricity 
to be fumi::·dwd to the puhlie for the production 
of light, heat, or power. 
"ln State ex rel. Public Sen:ice C(nnmission 
of Washington r. 8puka11e, 8!J ·wash. G!J9, 1G4 Pae. 
1110, L.RA. 1918 C, (i/;), the court said: 
" "l'he regulation awl control of busi-
ness of a pri\·ate uature is ::mstaiucd by ref-
erence to the police power, and even then 
it. is sustained o1lly when the courts have 
been (fully) ahle to say thai a hu::;iness is, 
in ehara('ter awl ext cut of operation, such 
that it tolH·he::; ll1e whole people and affect::; 
tl1eir general ·welfare. It i::; upon thi::; prin-
ciple that Noble Stale Hauk r. /Iaskell, 219 
U.B. 104, "' '' ·• awl German Alliaucr: Ins. Co. 
u. Kansas, 2:-l:3 U. S. :J8D, ... rest. Uutll the 
Legislature bring-:,; a business within the 
poliec power hy dear intent euurts will not 
do so. Courts lmve assumed to say whether 
an ad of ihc Lc·gislaturc falls within the 
police po'.ver, bui primarily the a:::;::wrtiun of 
police power is for the Legislature.' '' 
-*In the in::;taut ease, it i:-; our opinion that the 
Legislature has as::;erted its police power, and 
the busiue::;s of ilw plaintiff in error is dearly 
within the terms of the statute.• 
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In Claypool 11. l)igldt1.ing Delil'ery Company, 299 
Pac. 126, in dcterming when a person became a common 
earner the eourt Raid: 
"* * * Nor eau a carrier which holdR itself 
out to the public as being a eommou ('arrier diYeRl 
itRclf of that charader hceanRe it haR a Reeret 
or private intention to reRcrve the right to refuRe 
to Rerve Rueh partieR aR it objectR to, or because 
it may, even upon oceaRion, cxcrei~;e such riglli, 
particularly if sueh reRervation and exercise 
thereof is in n~ality, though not ostensibly, merely 
for the purpm;e of diveRting itself of the char-
acter and responsibility of a eommou eanicr.'' 
In .July of 1918 in l\1 iRsouri the l\1 issouri eourt 
was concerned with a brewery corporation where the 
corporation installed machinery to generate eleetrieal 
current, and its president, finding that there was surplus 
current, organized a company to sell current to individ-
uals in the vieinity, requiri11g them to conRtruct ami pay 
for li11es supplying eurrent, but with no fnmehise from 
the city. The court was faced with the problem of de-
termining whether the new company formed by the 
manager was a publie utility, and the court discussed 
the rules relating to public eorporations (Danciger & Co. 
v. Public Service Cmnmission of illlissouri et al, 205 S.\V. 
36). 'J'he <lefinition of au eleetric plant in the Missouri 
statutes wa:,; as follows: 
•· '"rhe term 'eleetrie plant,' when used in thiH 
ad, indudPs all real estate, fixtures ami personal 
property operated, coutrolled, owned, used or to 
he used for or in emmeetion with or to faeilitate 
tlJe generation, transmi:,;:,;ion, distribution, sale or 
furnishing. of eleetrieity for light, heat or power; 
* * * 
'' 'rhe term 'elertri<'al corpora tiou,' wl~en mwd 
in this act, includes every eorporation, company, 
* * * owning, operating, eontro11ing or managing 
a11y electric plant except wlwre eledricity iR gen-
m·ate<l or distributed hy the producer Rolely on 
or through private property for railroad purpoRes 
or for itA O\Yll m;e or the use of its tenants and 
11ot for Rale to others." 
'rhe court in deriding that ease held that the com-
pany was not subject to the Public Service Commission, 
but seems to have given great weight to the fact that 
there was 110 explicit profession of public service by 
the corporation io furnish lights or power to the whole 
public, or even to all persons in that restricted portion 
thereof who reside within three blocks of the Compa11y 'R 
plant; for there is in the case neither existence nor 
assertion of the right of eminent domain. Nor docs there 
exist any franchise or license, nor has there been ob-
tained any right or privilege to cross the streets, alleys, 
or other public places therein, nor are there any char-
ter powers authorizing the Company, or respondent, 
to engag'e in the publie service. How different is that 
case from the one before this eourt. The elements which 
the Court in the Danciger caRe said did not exist arc 
present to a large extent in the ease before this Court. 
In the case of Va'n Dyke v. Geary, 61 L . .BJd. 973, 
244 U. S. 39, the Supreme Court of the United States 
stated that a water system operated for ihe purpose of 
supplying water to the residents and inhabitants of a 
part of a townsite is a public utility so as to he subject 
to rate regulation hy the State Public Service Commis-
sion, although the plant is owned by an individual who 
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pumps the water on her own land, stores it in tanks on 
her own land, and then conducts it through pipes, all 
upon her own land, and delivers it to consumers at the 
boundary line between her and their lots with the un-
derstanding that water can be procured from such sys-
tem. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in delivering the opinion of 
the court, stated: 
'' The Van Dyke system appears to be the 
only water supply of the inhabitants of the orig-
inal town of Miami. The number of water users is 
not shown. But it appears that the large consum 
ers who use meters numbered, at the time of the 
Commission's investigation, 675, "" " 'Property 
becomes clothed with a public interest when used 
in a manner to make it of public consequence and 
affect the community at large' (Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U. S. 113, 126, 24 L. Ed. 77, 84). The property 
here in question was devoted by its owners to 
supplying a large community with a prime neces-
sity of life. rrhat Mrs. Van Dyke pumps the water 
on her own land, stores it in tanks on her own 
land, and thence conducts it through pipes all 
upon her own land (the strips reserved in the 
streets for conduits being owned by her), and 
delivers it to purchasers at the boundary line 
between her and their properties; and that lot 
purchasers bought with the understanding that 
they might purchase water from Mrs. Van Dyke's 
water system at rates fixed by her, - are all 
facts of no significance; for the character and 
extent of the use make it public; and since the 
service is a public one, the rates are subject to 
regulation. 
''Counsel eon tend that the use is not public, 
because water is furnished only to particular indi-
viduals, in fulfilment of private contracts made 
with the purchasers of town-site lots. But there 
is nothing in the record to introduce that such is 
the fact. Purchasers seem to have bought merely 
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with tlw oral understmtdiug that water could be 
seeured from ilte Van Dyke system. Affidavits 
filed by appel;auis :::;lalt~ Pxpressly that their 
water cystern is operatc:d 'for tlto purpmw of sup-
plying the rusidluls alJ(J inhabitants of said 
1\liami (o\nl 11ile with w.der, and not for the pur-
pose of supplyiug porsoHs gmwrally, with water.' 
'J1110 oi'fc,r thus ito to supp:y all the 'inlmbiiauts' 
within ilw gin;u <ll'~'il; a11d that, of course, in-
cludeto sull\'l'lHlec~''' tenantto, and others with whom 
the Van DYh's Jwd 110 voutraet relations. 'l'he 
fad that tl~e tot'1·viee ito limited to a part of the 
town of :\I iumi douto not prc\·eut i he \Yatur system 
from hei11g a publie uriii(y. ~·)ep Del Jl1ar Water, 
Light, & P. Co. 1·. Rsltlc111an, 1G7 Cal. G6G, 140 
Pac. 691. '' 
The Supreme Comi said that property became 
elothed with a publie interest wlwn utoed in a manner to 
make~ it of puhlic. eousequenee. Certainly the sale of 
electricity to a large part of tho inlmiJitants of Kane 
and Garfield Counties eauses the IH'orwrties of the 
Garkane Power Compauy to bc~eome clothed with a public 
interest. AlHl tho U. N. Supreme Court Raid that the 
fact tlwt the servic·e ',ntto limited to a pari of tlw town 
did not prevent it from !Jr:c·omiug· a puhlie utility. Even 
if the Garkaue PO\rer Company delivers tltit> power to 
stockholders ouly, the totoekltO!dcrB are a \'ery large 
segment of ihe popula\iclll of 1 he two eountie:,;, aud mHler 
the terms of the artic·lec of the eorporatiou will be in-
creased so as to iuelude a largc~r BegmenL Doesu't that 
elearly imlieate under Uw rulu laid dowu in the above 
entitled ea:,;e, that the c·ornpany is eloilwd with a publie 
interest"? 'l'he faet that it maketo speeial eon tracts does 
uot make• it auy lees a corporaticm dotlwd with a publie 
interest. 'l'lte public IK'c·omcs inture:,;ted when any com-
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pany attempts to supply a large segment of a community 
with the prime necessity of life, such as electricity, 
regardless of its contractual relations with its users. 
As a matter of fact, a prominent Utah lawyer, Mr. 
],rank Evans, in his work '' 'rhe J_,aw of Agricultural 
Cooperative Marketing," states, at page 309: 
"It will be observed that under the provisions 
of sub. (c) of Section 4 agricultural producers 
may organize cooperative associations for dis-
tributing electrical energy and for furnishing 
telephone service to its members. 'l'hore is, how-
ever, a condition attached to this grant of au-
thority, namely, that such associations shall com-
ply with existing laws applicable to other busi-
nesses of like kind. Under those terms, such 
associations might become amenable to public 
utility regulation and subject to the jurisdiction 
of public service or utilities commissions and thus 
to requirements as to convenience and necessity 
and as to schedules and rates of service." 
Such a writer as Mr. Evans, who is certainly an out-
standing man in the field of cooperative marketing, 
must have been impressed with the decisions of the 
courts in making the statement above referred to. 
In the case of Board of Railroad Commissioners v. 
Reed, 58 Pac. (2d) 271, the Montana Supreme Court 
had under advisement an action which was brought to 
enjoin the defendant Reed from operating motor vehicles 
on the state highways for the transportation of property 
for hire on a commercial basis, either as a common 
carrier or under a private contract, unless or until he 
had secured from the commission the necessary author-
73 
ity to do so. The defendant alleged that he was the 
employee of the Miles City Shipping Association, a 
voluntary association of business men banded together 
for the purpose of hanciling only the shipping of the 
goods of the associates m1cler contract. 'fhe court said: 
'' ''fhe regulation of motor transportation 
for the protedion of the public is a legitimate 
and wise exercise of the police power of the state, 
and courts generally have not been inelined to 
excuse the inerem;ing number who earn their 
livelihood by the u:,;e of the public highways for 
the transportation of persons awl property for 
hire from the respon:,;ibility of eommon carriers 
on merely teelmieal groumls, and they are partic-
ularly slow to excuse them when the plan of 
operatioll bean; evidence of a studied attempt to 
reap the rewanlH of <·ommon carrier:,; without 
incurring tlw eorrespo1Jding liabilities.' * * * 
'' 'Contrary to popular opmwn, mere 
schemes to evade law, onee their true character 
is established, are impotent for the purpose 
intended. Courts sweep them asi<le as so much 
rubbish' * * * and 'no form of subterfuge or 
evasion will IH·event the eourts from going behind 
the form to the substance' * * * This is the 
rule in thi:,; state even when those :,;eeking to 
evade liability or responsibility form a corpora-
tion. Scott 1:. fJrescott, ()£} Mont. G50, 22~~ P. 490." 
However, the court held that there :,;lwulcl be no in-
junction since the association was not made a party 
defendant and therefore the eourt could not declare the 
contract to be sham and subterfuge. 
The Commission should go behind the form of the 
Garkane Power Company ami view the substance. 
There can be hut one conclusion drawn from the form 
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of this corporation and that is that it is intended to 
perform the services of au eleetrical corporation to all 
who wish to procure its services within Garfield and 
Kane Counties subject, of course, to the territory served 
by the corporation. 
THE EVIDENCE~ O:B~ 'l'HJj~ GAHKANE COMPANY 
SHOWS THAT l'l' IS ORGANIZED 
TO SERVE THE PUBLIC 
In the case of Inland Empire Rural Electrification 
Inc. vs. Department of Pnbl,ir: Service of' Washington, 
et al, 92 Pac. 2nd 258, at page 2G3, the court said: 
''The question of the character of the corpo-
ration is one of fact, to be determined by the 
evidence uiselosed lJy the recoru. A corporation 
whieh is actually eugaged as a public utility 
cannot escape regulation by the state merely be-
cause its charter or its contraet eharaeterizes it 
as a private corporation.'' 
In this conneetiou it is illuminating to examine the 
evidence of some of the witnesses produeed by the appli-
cant before the Public Service Commission. The testi-
mony of Bert Gardner ('l'r. 322), states that the people 
of Mt. Carmel applied for membership in the Garkane 
Power Company in order to obtain service, and that 
twenty-three out of a possible twenty-seven joined. He 
further testified, '.L'rauseript 324: 
"A. Well, this contract, as l remember off-
hand, provides that people have applied for 
electric servi('e from the Garkaue Power Com-
pany, provided that they are able to obtain the 
necessary funds from the KE.A. to build the line, 
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and that they will take service with the Garkane 
Power Company as soon as it is made available 
and that they will agree to sign up to take this 
service for one year at a rate that was fixed at 
$2.70. When most of the contracts were written 
up that was the rate they gave us to advise to 
put on the contract so that it would show some-
thing; and that contract provides that a person 
can't obtain service without being made a member 
and that if they wish to withdraw they may do so 
after one month's notice, hut they must agree to 
pay up for service for one year to begin with but 
after that any time they wish to withdraw they 





I understand you pay a fee to join~ 
W c paid a fcc of $5.00; a membership 
Mr. Gardner testified that he was a member of the 
directors representing the town of Mt. Carmel (Tr. 
323). He further testified: 
"Q. Of course it's your desire to have 
power that motivates you to join the organiza-
tion~ 
"A. Yes, sir." ( Tr. 325). 
And in answer to a question he further testified: 
''As soon as a definite check up is made as 
to the cost, that will determine the rate, and 
the rate so far determined has been determined 
on the advice of R.E.A. specialists and the rates 
have never hecu set but there is a sort of rate 
that has been advised as a starting point to work 
from. It will he according to the cost of liquidat-
ing, the cost of building and keeping it up, etc. 
"Q. Did you pass the petition in order to 
secure members in Mount Carmel? 
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''A. 'Nell, I canvassed the town a half 
dozen times. I canvassed with applications for 
memberships - is that what you mean"! 
"Q. Yes. 
"A. And I have canvassed with applications 
for - well, it would he called a customer sur-
vey. 
"Q. Did you say yon held any official posi-
tion in the organization? 
''A. I do now, yes. 1 am a member of i he 
Roanl of Directors of the Garkaue. 
'' Q. What is your under'tStandiug aR to 
what yon might do under your Articles of Incor-
poration as to the people you serve? 
''A. I don't knO\v whether I quite under-
stand. 
'' Q. Who are you going to serve under the 
Articles of Incorporation - are you going to 
serve your members only? 
"A. Oh, yes. 'l'here is no one allowed to 
take service except people who have taken out 
membership in Oarkane Power Company. 
'' Q. Is there any rule that you have adopted, 
or you may adopt, to refuse people to join this 
assoeiation? 
"A. Well, the only ease of a refusal would 
he in a ease wl1ere people were so far away from 
the lines that it woudn't be feasible to connect 
them up; otherwise, so far as 1 know, there 
would he no reason. 
"Q. So far as it affects Mt. Carmel then, 
so far as you know then, anyone who desired to 
join your association, if he paid the fee of $5.00 
could join'? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
77 
'' (2. As you understand it, this is not a 
profit-making corporation? 
"A. Yes. vV e people are working together 
to obtain the service at cost, as otherwise it 
would not he possible. 
"Q. The Garkane Power Company, as you 
understand it, has the right to reject any and all 
applications? 
"MR. GARDN~-:JR: Well, yes, they have. The 
Board of Direetors has to pass on the applications 
and if there is auy good and valid reason why a 
person should be refm;ed they would have a right 
to refuse anybody; hut ordinarily they wouldn't 
ndm;e any except out of their reach. 
''MR. POR 'l'ljJR: Gar kane Power Company 
would not accept them simply because they made 
application'? 
"MR. PORTER: TlH• Board of Directors 
decides who shoultl he allowed membership, and 
if there is any good reason why anybody should 
11ot he allowed to join they could refuse who they 
choose, hut ordinarily they won't." 
( 'l'r. :326-327). 
At this point it might he well to eall attention to 
the fact that !vir. Gardner was slightly in error in his 
interpretation of the power of the Board of Directors 
because it clearly appears from the Articles of Incor-
poration that the o11ly grounds upon which refusal could 
be made would he if the person, firm, corporation, or 
body politic, wishing to become a member (a) did not 
pay a membership fee as specified, (b) agree to pur-
chase from the corporation the amount of electrical 
energy specified, and (c) did not agree to be bound by 
the Artic1es of Incorporation an<l By-Laws of the cor-
poration ('l'r. 40). l11 any event, the membership would 
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have the right to vote upon the acceptance of the appli-
cation ('l'r. 40). 
Mr. Ji~ardley testified that he was the engineer for 
the Garkane Power Company ('rr. 42!)), and thai where 
private property was crossed by the company's lines, 
easements had been procurred from the owners, and 
where a public highway was traversed the State Road 
Commission had granted a right-of-way (Tr. 330); that 
where the public domain was to he crossed rights-of-way 
had br~en procurred from the Forest Service or other 
Governmental agencies involved; that a permit lwd been 
granted by the ]'ederal Power Commission, and that 
each of the towns had granted a franchise authorizing 
construction of the lines ( 'rr. 3:n). 
Mr. Eardley further testified that it would reqUire 
a membership fee of $5.00 in order to join the eooper-
ative, in order to be supplied with power, and that was 
irrespeetive of how large a consumer of power the 
member was, (Tr. 335). He further testified that there 
are some members that are elassified as commercial con-
sumers, who sign up for $5.00 a month in order to get 
serviee, and that the Company was attempting to get 
the town to put in street lighting ( 'l'r. 335). 
JVfr. Ralph Blaekburn, who, it appears, was the 
person who signed the application of the Garkane Power 
Company, as President, for a Certifieate, ease No. 2262 
(Tr. 33), testified that a test survey was made and it 
was f(~lt that 0110ugh persons were interested to make 
a projed, and then members were secured and rights of 
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way and easements were taken; that they had 65 or 70 
members in Orderville out of 85 families (Tr. 338). 
While it is true that Mr. Eardley testified that each 
consumer only had one vote, Mr. Blackburn testified 
(Tr. 339): 
"A. Yes, all paid-up members. We have the 
paid-up members of the owners of the power 
plant. Mr. Carrol has two membership fees. Now, 
you stated that you can only have one vote, but 
wherever you are in a corporation it is some-
thing different from an individual, so Bishop 
Carroll owns a home being near the store he 
operates. He has to take out two and, of course, 
if he is the President of that he would have a 
vote for each. He is the President or Secretary 
of the Orderville Power Company. He handles 
most of their business and he has two member-
ships that way through his store. Mr. Heaton is 
another member of the Power Company - Order-
ville Power Company - and he also has mem-
bership in the Oarkaue for his home and for 
his garage, and lw and his brothers have taken 
out a membership for the Heaton garage. 
Mr. Blackburn further testified that no money was to 
be taken out for profit or sinking fund, but only for cost 
and maintaining the lines aud paying back the interest. 
He further testified that the membership fee was used 
for the first cost of obtaining a loan and different ex-
penses before the loan was granted, and that it came 
under what was called a construction fund, and was 
used sometimes to pay mileage for directors and for 
other things that the Government didn't allow to be 
paid for from the grant of $177,000 (Tr. 340). 
He further testified (Tr. 341): 
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'' Q. Can you think of any reason now why 
you would reject any member? 
''A. Nothing, unless it would be that we 
have beeu held to the restriction of 1,000 feet. 
'' Q. You know of no reason and, in other 
words, you hold yourself out to serve any and 
everyone that comes, if they come within the limit 
of 1,000 feet and pay their $5.00 you will serve 
them? 
"A. Of course they would have to live up 
to the by-laws and rules and regulations. 
"Q. But, there isn't any reason why anyone 
should be turned away? 
"A. No, sir. In fact, that is the purpose of 
it -to give power to those rural districts where 
we have not been able to obtain central station 
power." (Tr. 241). 
He further testified that there were around 600 members 
in the Garkane Company and that when it was first 
started they had a possible 785 to work on (Tr. 342). 
Mr. Merle J. Spencer testified that in Glendale 
there were about 50 or 60 families and that there were 
about 45 families that were members of the Garkane 
Power Company (Tr. 345). 
Mr. Harold H. Heaton testified that there were 
about 40 families living at Alton and there were about 
30 families in that territory who were members of the 
Gar kane Power Company ( 'rr. 345). 
''A. There is nothing to stop anyone from 
coming in. With any of the franchises that we 
have, if they can prove to the town or cities that 
they are going to furnish the power cheaper, 
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there iH nothing to hold the members more than 
.10 dayH after the first year.'' 
He further testified testified that it was the plan of the 
Company to serve the 'l'own of J<Jscalante and other 
towns in the same vicinity. Mr. Blackburn further tes-
tified: 
''A. Well, as I understand it, a public utility 
is to work in behalf of the interests of the public 
in general, and the cooperative or company, or 
whatever it might be tltat is serving the public 
- to see that the public is dealt fairly with and 
that they have a fair priee set on the merchandise, 
or whatever it might he - in this ease, elec-
trical energy. 1 think it has been a proved fact 
that they have clone a great deal for the State of 
Utah - the Public Service Commission has." 
(Tr. 3G8). 
Mr. Blackburn further testified (Tr. 359): 
(""/ JOA~ ~-,: 
"MR. frA.RDNER: It isn't only whether 
you say you serve the public or not - it is what 
you actually do - are you holding yourself out 
to serve any and all who ask you for service'? 
I haven't had anyone yet give any reason why 
they would reject anyone if they had this $G.OO 
and lived within a thousand feet of the lines of 
the Garkane Power Company. Now, is that what 
you are proposing to do - hold yourself out to 
Herve the publie "? 
''MR. BLACKBURN: Well, we are not 
trying to refuse~ but ~we have the right to reject 
them. 
"MR. GRANGIDR: You couldn't reject 
them just heeam;e they had red hair, or some-
thing like that? 
"1\IR. BLACKBURN: Well, we might have 
to fix up some excuse. 
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"MR. GRANGER: Well, there would have 
to be some good reason, but I haven't been able 
to conceive of any if they live within a thousand 
feet of your lines you will take it to them. 
"MR. PORTJ1~R: Supposing someone filed 
an application and refused to grant us a right of 
way over the premises to their home - what 
would be the result? 
"MR. BLACKBURN: Well, we couldn't 
give him power. 
"MR. POR'l'ER: Would you reject his ap-
plication? 
"MR. BLACKBURN: Yes. (Tr. 359). 
"MR. POR'l'ER: rrhat's a part of the con-
tract is it not? 
"MR. BLACKBURN: As far as I know, 
there is nothing set up anywhere in the allotment 
of money for the projeet to buy rights of ways 
and easements and if anyone refuses to give a 
right of way or easement or to abide by any of 
our rules, as set fourth in the Articles of Incorpo-
ration and by-laws, we have a right to reject 
them. 
''MR. PORrl'FJR: 'l'hat is a part of the con-
tract, is it not, that he has to pay the $5.00 mem-
bership and also grant Garkane Power Company 
a right of way over his premises to the point of 
service"? 
''MR. BLACKBURN: Yes. 
"MR. GRANGER: That's a rather far-
fetched example. I wouhln't apply and pay $5.00 
and then refuse to do that." ( Tr. 360). 
Mr. Middleton is the Superintendent of the Garkane 
Power Company (Tr. 364), and he stated that it was 
his duty to go out and get easements and rights of way 
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wherever the line crosst'S either the property of the 
members or other individuals that own any of the 
property ( 'rr. 365). 
Mr. Eardley further testified (Tr. 370) that the 
rate at first was based on 504 :,;igued members, but that 
later 50 or 60 others, iucluding two big commercial con-
sumers, one of whom is Bryce Canyon, had come into 
the Company. He also testified that they had prospects 
for 2 or 3 large eonsumers of power. 
It is apparent from the te::;timon~T of the witnesses 
of the applicant and from the Articles of Inct>rporation 
and by-laws, that regardless of the view taken by tl1e 
court as to the effeet of the revision of the statutes 
upon the original language of the Utility Act, the Gar-
kane Power Company iutends to serve the public gen-
erally. 
Spurr, on Guiding Principles of Public Service 
Regulatious, Volume 1, Page 23, has this to say about 
the matter: 
"'ro :,;urn the matter up briefly, it appears 
that the legislative policy has been clearly to 
specify all of the utilitie:,; intended to be placed 
under the authority of the Commission; that, in 
most iustarwes, this has been so well done as to 
leave little opportunity for controversy, that all 
of the well knowu utilities arc, without question, 
under the control of modern Commissions; that 
oreasionally questions have arisen as to whether a 
particular business is :,;uhjcd to regulation, but 
that these question:,; have been relatively few and 
comparatively unimportant." 
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And agam at Volume 1, page 26: 
"Since the state cannot by its mere say so 
transform a private business into a public calling, 
and theu proeeed to regulate it, the question 
whether a business falling within the above class-
ifieatiom; really <'Onstitutes a puhlie calling, is 
VPl',Y pertinent. 
"It is hard to tell just what the differen<'e 
is hetwePn a public all(l private ealling, that it to 
say, between public service and privatt~ business. 
'l'he sale of eleetrieity to the people is undoubtedly 
a public service. 'L'he sale of neWSIJapers would 
probably be deemed a privatp business. 'l'he sale 
of water to tlw people is everywhere regarded 
as a public calling, and the sale of soap as a pri-
vate enterprise. What is the fundameutal tlis-
tinetion which marks one of these undertakings 
as public and the other private"? 'l'wo answen; 
suggest themselves immediately. One is that the 
operation of electrie all(] water plants requires 
the use of the publie highways for whieh fran-
chises must he had, while the sale of newspapers 
or soap does not. 'l'he other is that electric and 
water companies operate under monopolisti<' 
L"onclitions while the others clo not. 
"But these are not infallible tests and, there-
fore, not the real distinguishing marks, be(•ause an 
examination of the cases shows that a business 
may he public although it does not use the high-
ways, possess loeal franehises, or operate under 
monopolistic conditions. If these differmH·es are 
immaterial, what else is there about one business 
that makes it puhlie and another that eharaeter-
izes it as flrivate? NO (h~finite answer can be 
gi VE'Il. * * * '' 
With the evidence as it was before the Commis-
sion, can it be said that the Garkaue Power Company, 
merely beeause each person taking power must also 
become a member, is immune from regulation of the 
Commission? vVhat about the consumers of the elec-
trical energy - arc they not to he considered 1 Can 
it be said that bccam;c the company causes everyone 
who would be a patron of the company to become a 
member, exempt it from the ;juri8didion of the Com-
mission, even if in the proce88 of its husine8s it furnishes 
electrical energy to other puhlie utilities, to political 
subdivisimm, and numerous eustomer8 "? Arcn 't con-
8umers of other eluetrie eompanie8 to be protected "l 
Shouldn't tl1e Commission protect the patrons of the 
Gar kane Company "l 
I quote this language from the ease of Publ'ic 
Utilities Cmwrnission of Utah us. Oar-viloch, 54 Utah 
406, 181 Pacific 272: 
'' 'l'lte tm;t, where the commi88ion has juris-
did ion over a particular utility, is not whether 
the party complaiut of, aH here, iH operating au 
automobile or stage line for hire over a route 
upon a 8chedule or a a fixed rate of fare for the 
8ervice8 n'lHlt~red, but the test is whether he is 
in fad opera! ing a public utility over a material 
portion or the \\·hole of an e8tabli8hed route 
over wltie!J auother luu; UJCrctofore obtained from 
the eommis;,;ioJJ a eert ifiC'a t e of convenience and 
neeesro;ity io Oj)(~rate a publie utility. * * * If, 
therefore, by ;:;oliciting patr01wge, as hereinbefore 
illu8tra ted, itc may, nevertheless, be prohibited 
from so iuierfering. Such, it 8eem8 to us, is 
manifestly tlle purpose of Ute act. If such is not 
the emw, regulation will accomplish nothing and 
the public iuten't.:;[ will not thereby by subserved.'' 
In the ease of Acquadcanonk Water Company vs. 
Boar-d of Public Utilities Co,mmissioners, 118 Atl. 535, 
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we find that the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
a company whose business is confined to selling water 
under contract to other companies or municipalities, 
which in tum distribute and sell to the public, is a pub-
lic utility, and therefore under the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Public Utilities. The Act of New Jersey giving 
jurisdiction to the Board was as follows: 
'' rl,he board shall have general supervision 
and regulatiou of, jurisdiction and control over, 
all public utilities, * * * 'rhe term 'public utility' 
is hereby defined to inelude every individual, co-
partuership, * '' • that now or hereafter may own, 
operate, manage or control ,,, * * any * * * water 
" * '' system, plant or equipment for public use, 
under privileges granted or hereafter to be 
granted by the State of New .Jersey or by any 
political subdivisioiJ thereof.'' 
The Court in deciding the ease said: 
"Under the provisions of the statute, the 
ownership, management, operation, or control of 
a water plant, system, or e(1uipmeut must be for 
public use, and sueh public usc must be under 
privileges granted by the State or a political 
subdivision thereof. 
''The East .Jersey Water Company unques-
tiouably owns and controls a water supply system 
aud its equipment, jointly with the other water 
eompanies; but is the ownership, management, op-
eration, and control for 'public use' within the 
meaning of the Act'? 
''Such ownership, mainteuance, or control of 
a water system under the statute must be for 
public use· uuder privileges granted by the State 
or its political subdivisions. · 
"1 agree with the Board of Publie Utility 
Commissioners that the East Jersey Water Com-
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pan.v owns and controls a water supply system 
and its equipment, jointly witl1 other water com-
panies. \Vhen~ 1 differ from them is in think-
ing that the mnwrship, management, operation, 
and control are for public use, within the mean-
ing of the ad. i do not think the answer to this 
question depends upou tlw fact that the l1~w..;t 
.Jcn..;oy "Water Compmty was incorporated under 
the General Corporatiou Ad. lt dopcmls ou 
wheUwr, as the situation uow iH, with the various 
eomplicatiom; and ramifieations, the l<~ast .Jersey 
Watt>r Company is engaged in the business of 
SllJlJllying \Vater for tlw muuieipalities with 
whieh it haH relatious. 1 t does not make any 
differenee iu my mind that it sells water at 
wholesale. Its coum,dions with tho loeal water 
companies arc such that virtually it supplies 
!he inhabitants of several, perhaps all, the mu-
nicipalities by virtue of the rights of Uw local 
water eompanioH. At any rate, iu order that the 
tho rates for water to the individual citir.ens may 
lJC properly rogulaie(l, it is t•sscntial that the plan 
Hhould be dealt with as a whole, and it may be 
uecessary in form to deal with each company, 
for obviously if the rate for water supplied by 
the ]~ast Jersey Water Company could not lle 
regulated, the l<~ast ,Jprsoy Water Company might 
eharge ouc of its customers more and others 
loss, and might make up the loss on a low rate 
from a loeal company by impoHing a high rate 
for tlw wl10l<•salc dt~livery. 'l'his, I think, could 
not have heou tho int eut of tho Legislatures. 
Tho cases eitml on behalf of the I:<Jast .JerHey 
Water Company support my view; tho case is 
quite similar iu some of its aspeds to tho <'ase 
of the II askensar1r Water Co. vs. Board of Public 
Ut,ility Cmnmissioners, 903 N .• J. Law, 293, 112 
At!, i"J95, whid1 was ro<'cntly before me. 
"As to the I<JaHt .Jersey Water Company hav-
iHg privileges from the state or munieipalitios, 
1 think it <~mmgh to say that it has the privilege 
of being a eorpora tion from tho state, which is 
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enough to authorize, and it has the privilege of 
t!oing husiuuss in the various municipalities awl 
distributing water therein." See North Shor·e 
Fish a.nd Freight Co. vs. North Shore Business 
Men's Truck Assn., 260 N.W. f)8; Standard Oil 
Cornpany ns. City of TJiru·oln, 207 N.W. 172; 
Dairymen's Cooperative Sales vs. Public Set·vice 
Commission 174 Atl. 826; Eagle-Pitcher Lead. 
Cornpany vs. Henryetta Gas Co., 112 Okla. (i;), 
239 Pac. 8DO. Pond Public Utilities, Section 808, 
page 1824, Volume :3; Section 44, pagl~ 108, Vol-
ume1; Charles ~Volfe Packirtg ComJJany "1'8. Court 
of !rtdusfrial Relations, 262 U.R. G22. 
While it is true that there are some cases iuvolving 
mutual telephone companies. in which the courts have 
held that the companies did not cornu under the juris-
diction of a regulatory commission, it is interesting to 
note the language used by the Public Utilities Com-
mission of .Michigan in the case of Speaker vs. Larkin 
Rural Telephone Company, 27 P.U.R. (N.S.) 18:-i: 
'"l'he owners of these telephone lines eont end 
that they cousiiiute an exception to the general 
rule and that the property of these rural teie-
phone lines is not subjcet to public usc and reg-
ulation. No one of these stockholders or copart-
ners would think, if they owned a railroad im;tl~ad 
of a telephoue line, that they migl1t refuse io 
carry the property or perhaps pen;ous of 
those who desir<~d not to hl~eome members of the 
railroad company. Yet this is the attitude taken 
in n~lation to telephone liues and faeilitie1-1 iu 
that virinity, in violation of the statute regulating 
telephmw eompm1ies which expressly provides 
that 'all laws so far as applieahle now in force 
or that may hereinafter be enaded regulating the 
transportation of persons or property by rail-
road eompanies withiu the statE.~ shall apply with 
equal fon~e awl effeet to telephone companies. 
(Par. 1, Ad 20G, P.A. 191:3). J1Jvery person must 
be presumed io know tlult in enteriug the tele-
phine husim~ss tlwy are ellgagiug uot in a strictly 
priYa tu toutnprise, but i11 a public business 
charg<~d wi1l1 the public interest, subjeei to public 
control and iu wlJicl1 t IJpy eould not arl>itrarily 
give or rdm;e to gi,·e snviee in aecordanee with 
their own judgmmli, whim, or caprice. The 
eontrol over a telepllmH; lim~ and its use is 
suhscn·ient to tiw public iutPn~st. 'l'hc respoudent 
carrier must, therefore, l10lll itself ready to pro-
vide rea:-:owd1iy adequate service io all, members 
and uoHml'mb(~rs, without disnimination as to 
rates or service, who may l1e so located as to be 
within the teiTiiory of 1lw company." See Re 
Baker Rlcdric CoojJcratirr~, Inc. 21 P.U.R. (N.S.) 
150. 
See nauis l's. Pu!Jlir: UtiWies Commission, 247 Pac. 
801, 7!) Colo. G42, wlwrein the eourt lm<l miller consid-
eration the jurisdiction of the Commission over one 
transportiug freight hy motor vehiele, between Grand 
.Junetion aml Paonia. ln that ease, tlw shippers who 
wore members of tlic~ association were shippers of 90% 
of the freight earried ill thai ten·itory. Davis owned the 
equipment and lmd a contxaet with the association bind-
ing him to haul for ilwt-le ouly who belouged to it, by 
accepted shii>ment frem llOll-memlwrs to members and 
vwe versa, 011 the order and payment of either. He 
maintained a storage stati01l at Delta and insured the 
goods transported, eha1·ged regular rates, which were 
paid by ilw iJI(lividual sl1ippers, uot by tho association. 
The court in deeiding the ease said: 
''Had dl•feJI(laut made all save mw of the 
shippers of freight iu Umt territory, or all pur-
ehasers of voslage al auy post office therein, 
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members of the association, and elaimed that 
such limitation converted an otherwise public 
into a private c-arrier, ihe contention would be 
so absurd as to lw im.;tantly rejected. But the 
reasoilR for that re;jedion would lw the identical 
reasons which demal!d rejeetion of defendant's 
contention, in the instant case: (a) The propor-
tion of the public t'erved is so large as to be the 
public; (a) U10 limitation iRa mere device to 
hoodwink the law. 
Here the Company has aR patrons about 85% of 
all families in the territory. 
It appears that if another utility wished to buy 
from the Garkane Company and sell to the public, it 
could do so by: obtaining a membership in the corpora-
tion. 
In the case of Batesville Telephone Cornpany vs. 
Public Seruice Cornrnission, 38 J1'ecleral, 2nd 511, the 
Federal Court had under consideration the status with 
relation to the public Service Commission of a cooper-
ation associatiou called the Farmers' l\futual 'felephone 
Company. '!'he seetion of the statue pertinent was as 
follows: 
Section 1 of the Utility Aet defines a "public 
utility" to be "every corporation, company, individual, 
association or individuals, '' * ,. that now or hereafter 
may own, operate, manage, or control * * * any plant or 
equipment within the State, for the conveyances of 
telegraph or telephone messages * * * either directly 
or indirectly, to or for the public. (Burns Ann. St. 1926, 
Section 12672). 
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Aml the Court said: 
" (1, 2) 'rhe first question that presents 
itself to the court for consideration is whether 
o1· not the defendant 'l'<~lephmte Company is a 
'public utility' as that term is defined in the 
Utility Act. If it is not a public utility, then 
the Commission has no jurisdiction over it, 
and the order entered on November 23, 1928, is 
void and of 110 effect. ~Under the evidence, the 
defendant 'l'elephone Company owns and oper-
ates a telephone exeha11ge to which is connected 
several rural lines. 'l'he exchange is located out-
side the eorporate limit::; of the town of Versailles, 
and all its lines, at the present time, are outside 
the <·orporation limits of SU(~h town. But, uwler 
the evidence in this case, it is able, willing, and 
ready to furnish the citizem; of ~rsailles with 
tele]Jhmw service, if ~md when such citizens con-
struet a line or lines and eomwet with its ex-
change. 'l'he number of its membership is not 
limitPd, so far as is disclosed hy the evidence. 
It is ready and \villing to serve all, that is, the 
general public. Under this situation, it cannot 
he seriously contended that the defeudant 'l'ele-
phone Company is not a 'public utility,' as that 
term is m;ed in the Utility Act. 1t is compm;ed 
of an 'association of individuals' who own, oper-
ate, manage, and control a plant aml equipment 
within the state for the emtvenience of telephmw 
messages directly to and for the public. Fur-
thermore, it has filed with the Commission, and 
there is llO'N on file Uwrewith, a sdwdule of ratet:l, 
all of which iiHli<'ate that both the Commission 
awl the dt~fend<lllt 'l'dephmw Company are agreed 
that it is a 'pnhlic ui ility.' The mere fact that 
tdeplunw srWI'ice is to !Je furnished to its patrons 
at cost, that it is a cooperatire association, and 
tlot formed for or opPrated at a profit, is imma-
fPrial. Neither of these eknwnts is necessary to 
ma),·p of it a JJUIJlir· utility." 
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See Rr Baker Rlectric Cooperative, Inc:., 21 P.U.R. 
(N.S.) 150, 51 C .• J., page 40, Section 79; 51 C .. J., page 
5, Sections 2 and 4. Ill ~West Virginia the Public Service 
Commission had before it the idelltieal question pre-
sellted iu this cause, in re Tl arrison Rural Electrification 
Association, lnr:., 24 P.U.li. (N.S.) 7. The corporate 
reorganizatioll of tlw Harrison question was very simi-
lar to the one now before this court. 'l'he Commission, 
in deciding the ease, decided that the West Virginia 
statute provided thai the Commissiou had jurisdiction 
over "all public utilities in this state and shall inel11de 
any utility engaged in auy of the following services: 
Generation and transmission of electrical euergy by 
hydro-electric or other utilities for service to the pub-
lie * * * '' 
'l'he Commissiou said: 
"lit view of our state's Htat ute, we do not 
agree with intervener's and avplieant'H conten-
tion that beeauHe its members serve tlH•mselves 
only the general public has no intereHt ill the 
classification of applicant's legal status. We 
realize that there are responsil>ie authoritieH that 
hold that such cooperatives as the applicant are 
not public utilitieH. Our examinatiou ot' them, 
however, diseloseH that they are haHed upon con-
ditions in juriHdidions where the }JUhlie polit·y 
all(l HtatuteH are dissimilar to ours. OUwr au-
thorities hold sueh cooperatives to be public util-
itil•s. Sinee it eamwt he llenied that the legis-
lative poliey Hpeeit'ieally declared in this scale 
is to confer regulatory jurisdiction in tltis Com-
mission over municipally or publicly owned or 
operated eleetric plants, and associations of all 
kinds, as utilities, as well aH over privately owned 
eleetric plantH, there seemH to he uo doubt that 
publicly owHcd Oi' operated clcetrie plants in 
rural cornmlmili<·:•. ;~•·e ijk,:wit-w suhjcet to the jur-
isdie:i(jlJ or tlJC ( 'm1lm ssion, and Uwt eleetrie 
businesse:.; condnl'ied hy Uw pulJiie for the mem-
bers of th;;t pullii" an· :niJj(~t·i to state regulation 
under our st<Jtutes. 
"\Ve do aoi IJPli<'YP ! hat iht' applicant's char-
ter pro\·is;ullo.; to !lw ;__:fl'vd i hat it 'shall render 
no servivlc \o ol' i'or ·lie pulJii<'' is either determi-
nativt: or J'c:lmc: \'t• ol' its le~a! stat us. The 
statute <l(•:·;nn•,; llH· att•'s poliey with reference 
to stwh nu1 ll·l·:;, ;uHl ,·:•H1ro!s. 'J'his <~harter lan-
guag<' se<'lllc: ~o '!l~ :t rnurt: self-~:erving dedara-
t ioH of IW \l:c:igiJ·r ;wr se, vmdrary to the statute. 
A eltnrivr <:x<·mpi ion !'rom any le~al liahiliay, 
duty, limitation, or imrmmiiy, othenvise applic-
able to tlw eorp:,rali<llt, would obviom;ly be void. 
''\Ve d<J not hulic:n~ lila[ Ute S1Jeeial relatiou-
Hhip oi' mc·mk•n; of a eouperniive to the eorporate 
entity, or to u!le ;utOtlJt·r, l'<lll be used as a ruse 
to avoid llie COJISC<Jll<'lll·us wltieh nrc attached to 
pul!lil' Sl~n·iel' undc:r t]J(: lnw. ~--lee Pipe Liue 
Cai-leH (l';tiied States r. Ohio Oil Co.) (HJ14) 234 
U. S. 3+8 X lli nur·is 1'. ]'l'o}Jle ('):' rel. l'u!Jlic 
l.rtililics ConunissiuJi, 'l!J Colo. 742, '' '' '' 247 Pac. 
801, llw (·ourl Sd~J, \\ilJ1 1·ei·~,reucu 1o a restridiou 
of sun· ice to 1Lc mondH·<·c; of an m;:.;oeiatiou, ''L'he 
limitation is a rnnc: d;_:\<t·c: to lwodwiuk Uw law.' 
'"l'ht> npp:ican( a;.;c;o<·intion waH ('rented and 
exists for llo iller i11ll' 11osu ilum (o proeun~ elec-
tr·i(·ity for ;:;:d m;;l,t• it avui;a!Jle to itc; members. 
'l'hai ·is U1·.· z;~u:; n <~:-:oll for \l·hil'lt memht>rs joiu 
it. \'{;lh liCilLll;:, ;;rut\'dural requirements for 
all of the puh::c· :u tl!e <li'l'a of tlte projeet. 
'' 'l'lle ap:li :I nni '::-: lllOJ!r>y <·omes throu~h the 
]'ederai H1ll':ti ;.;,t,<-1 n;·ifat iou Administration 
from I l1e 1!1 ··u;;:;l nH·• :oil l,'inalll'l) Corporation. 
1'lll' 1hm;\ i,~:~~(<r~\';;·:l'liml Ad o{ ~lay 20, 1936, 
provides for lonns from l1'edend money8 'for 
rural cdt•driJ'lc.tl i<nl a11d ilH' furllishiug of elec:-
tric energy to JH'l'SOllS in rural areas who are not 
rccciYing eeniral siatioll f-lerTiru.' (ll. E. A. Act, 
Chap. 4i32, 4~) E)tai. Code of Laws of 7 U.S.C.A., 
Chap. 31, Pars. ~)02 am! ~J04 ), and further pro-
vides: '* * * no lomJ for Uw (·omdrudion, opera-
tion, or elll:1 rgemen~ d :m~v {.\;(•Herating plant shall 
be made mtle::.;s ihc· COJISeld cf ihe state authority 
having jurisdidiun in t l11· premises 1s first ob-
tained.' Seetiou ~J04. 
"Since tlw loan is made from public funds, 
'persous ill rural a r;_;a:s, L'o1· ·whose beuefi t it is 
made, must ml;<m 'ali' such ptrsous iu each such 
area capable alHl desirous or reeel\ing such bene-
bit, situated so us io be pradicnlly :snsceptable 
of receiviHg iJw elt;dr1e scTviee. \Ve do noi feel 
Congress iHlmHbl pn!J i<' mo11eys to be advanced 
for Uw benefit oi' a pcn;on or elnss ouly of the 
people of au area awl dcm:ed lo others ·witltiu ihe 
area vYilliug aud ub:e to ru('eiYe it. Such funds 
were evidently iuteudc•ct for all members of the 
puhlie iu il!e 'area io hu served, awl it would be 
contrary to tlw lcgislu1in~ i:1Lent [lJat mum1Jership 
in this cooperative asi-ioe:ation BllOu!J 1Je exclusive 
and self-determin~divc .. \lnnlwrship iu the asso-
eiatiou has hcell acli\·u]y soiicited auJ no applica-
tiou lws hePu refu:-wd. Line:,; :tre to l1e eonsirueted 
ou and aero:,;s pubiic road:.;. l\lembership iu the 
associatim1 am1 the clt•dric servicu to be secured 
through ii is of public c·onsequeuee of the area 
at large. Siuee Fedtcral J'uiH1s are not to be 
advanced for purely privntc rmrposes, it fol-
lows from tlu· i'orc~~;u1Ilg· ;•oJlsiderations that the 
applicant':,; projt;d rru!si ;;p for \he purpose of 
serYing the public gt•ucraHy in the lenitory where 
eonstrul'tcd, :llld tl1:<l :t \\-i;; remler a public ser-
vice. ln otJH·r words, i: wi~~ hL' a utiJity with its 
service available to ali tlw local iulwbitants. 
"'l'he t;YideJH·e i~. f'l('<:l' t!Jat tire applicant 
and the protesiaut an• <H·Lual and adiv0 compet-
itors will1 eaeh otlll'r :n ecrr~1i11 loealities for cus-
tomen.;, loeati<m, a11d pn'emptin• rights. '11his is 
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the very sit nat ion ~w!Jieh tl1c legislature through 
the State Rlwnld rcg·ulate wliell it passed Par. 11. 
H is busid<· the poini now tllldt~r diseussion 
~w!Jcj hc~r Uw prot<~s1an1 lias any prior rights iu 
the territory or superior ability to sen'c the 
publi<' tlwreiu, ~wh<•ilwr it has f'orfcit<~d any sm·h 
rigll(s hy its coll<luel, or whether tl1e applieaut. 
is eniitl<•d to a ei<wr field without eompdition or 
to 1lw right to compel<~ with the older utility. 
'l'lwsc are the very questions to be eonsid<·n~d ou 
tlte merits aml d<derminnd hv the Commission 
upon 1 he applieation for a <·c~·tificate undL'r tlw 
law and the cvid<,w·e. 'L'lw legislature intended 
that the Commission shouid decide in such eases 
whether tlw puhlie vnMare and benefit would )H~ 
]H,st served and s<>eured hy the o1w or the other 
em1tender. 'L'lw rcasm1 anZl policy of the statute 
npp<,ar:-; to lw plain and we hclicv<) mo:-;1 salutary. 
1\11 i ndu:-;t ry ('<l nnot he regulated effect.i vely in 
part with tlw other part. nnregnbt1t•<l. 
'J'he lm1guage of ilw Commission in the Harrison 
H ura I J1~lc'l'i ri fie a tion eas<~, that the Federal Govc~rn­
ment being the entitly that is lending the funds must 
speeify thai tlw full(ls will he u:-;ed only for public pur-
poses, is so logical that it leads to hut one conelusiou, 
and that is, if the publie fuuds are usPd for the purpose 
of allowing the Ga rkane Power Company to furnish 
electrical e1wrgy to m<~mbL•r:-;, then eleetrieal energy must 
also be fnrni:-;hed to the J!libli(: a:-; thai term is generally 
defined. 
'!'he Obio ~uprenw Court in the ease of lndustrial 
Gas Co. 1'. Pul;lic Utilities Commiission of Ohio, 21 N. E. 
(2nd) 1GG, had under eonsideration a request that the 
gas company be permitted to withdraw property from 
service to uomPstie users of gas aml woulu not he subject 
~ )(j 
to jurisdiction of the Commissiou on the ground that 
it was no longer a public utility and therefore, not sub-
ject to the regulation and control of the Commission. 
The company had amended its Articles of Incorporation 
to state: "I~'or the purpose of produeiug, acquiring, dis-
tributing and selling natural gas for industrial use, only, 
and in connection therewith, acquiring, operating and 
disposing of leases and other properties incident there-
to.'' rehe gas compauy operated a trausmission system 
in several towns in Ohio hut owned no gas wells. The 
property consisted of pipe liues, measuring stations and 
certain buildings. The company operated about 50 miles 
of pipe line and served 19 iwlustrial and 12 private 
consumers located in five or six different towns, all 
under written contracts, which stipulated the price to 
be paid for gas. The gas (•ompauy did not hold itself 
out to serve the public generally and had refused to 
serve certain industrial and private users in its terri-
tory. The 12 private consumer~:-; had been givn the priv-
ilege of buying as a part of the consideration for right 
of way grants across their property. No proceedings of 
condemnation had Leen instituted to acquire property 
or right of way. 'l'he Court in upholding the Public 
Service Commissioll finding Umt the gas company was a 
public utility within the statute ~:-;aid that under the 
sections of the Public Utility Aet, a pcrsou, partnership, 
association or corporation engaged in the business of 
supplying natural gas for lighting, power or heating 
purposes to consumer~:> within tlJiH State or in the Lusi-
ness of tram;porting natural gas through pipes or tubing, 
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either \Yholly or part:n'ly \lllliin 1l1is Stale is denomin-
ated a public uli::ty <LJld tb·ian:d snhjc:ct to regulation. 
We mnst :t~lmii ;.1 t!tu t:ll~~wt tltat Uw Ohio statute 
1s mueh more ;iwlll::;\.l' tluH\ u:1r 0\\'11. llowen:r, the 
rcasouiug· of the \ 'oun ,u nn:\ iJ:g at its deeision is so 
pertiuent to tlw red~;cl!ing iluli. mn::>i be iudulged in by 
the Couri lll 1l1i~' cast, tlui1 wish to take the 
liberty of <lnoti11g fu;,y from the ease. 
"it rn«y \\·;•Ji : ' urg'(·d tlml a <'Orporatiou, 
<'<denialun w •.·ow '·' \\·![11 }JUl>lie utilities aud 
talw a\\'<tY lnn;:nl :·'-::> 1'nn:1 : iwm, ::;]JOuld be under 
like l't,gn,:~iory n·.<rid:on ii' di'cdive goveru-
nwut:u ~;npt:rn~H\dt i:-; to l;c• maintained. Aciual 
or lJOtuHLla! <·om;H_:UJi.IJ \\;[it odwr eorporatious 
11·hcse Lm.;m(•,;s .:·: hot iit'd v;i ,lJ a vuiJlil~ interest 
i::; a fad(Jl' .u ill: < ,;m;i(i:•n•d; olllen,·ise eorpo-
ratwm; :.·owd i)e (Jl'!..;'<UUZt·d to uperaLe like appel-
lant :tJI(l in l'i)lll 1 Jt~ltlt<Jll 1ndJ tJOll<t fide utititiet> 
uut1l ihc• \\;!cod' ~' n.e ,-,·m1:d IJe lwHuy-eomlJed 
witl1 UlUil «>He 1 nLJ11<~ reg·watJOIJ would beeomc a 
siwm <llld de; U::ll\lli. 
"\Villil "l'JlU'iallt c;cek::> Lo do ic; to pick out 
eerlHtll Uldl!:·;t J'J(l: r~(;it:-lULll:l's ill seied Lerritory 
and sen c \l,,·HI undu:· :-;;JU(~iaJ (~<J!llrads to the 
exvlu::;;cll o: <~:i :,: ;,,:r~; c•xcl:pt :,;uvh tH'ivaie or 
Llome:-;Llc . \'ilhliiLJ.~.·: :: n~,ty :~nit its eouvenience 
awl :ui.\·<ull«~;t. t Lcl'e wen_: otlwr iudusirial con-
sumen; willl \\ lL.i.ll tlic <lJllJe!iaHt 1·efused or failed 
to agree~ :~lid so d:,t Lol c;(:rn: lltem. If sueh eon-
sunll;rs \\en· :" 1·,·l:' ,,, ai,, ic musl. ueeessarily be 
IJy a <·:,m1;dnc;. d. a Lu:-;!;;v::;c; so ean·ied on may 
e::s<:<tpe pul ;<. i"e~;u:;:l:c.n :!Jell theru would seem to 
l>L: uo va:'d r; <h"·i: 1, ii)" «;!pei:ant may Hot extend 
the sen';<.,, io <[o;:;J;c, t.rip:e or many iimes the 
numl:l'l' !l(,\\ :'crvud \\'illH;ut heing amenable to 
reguiati\·c mcabure;-:. 
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"A public utility to 11H~ extent of its capacity 
is houm1 to :c;c•rn· those of !lw public~ who need the 
service am1 arc witllin tlw field of its operations, 
at reasonable ralCH nwl without discrimination. 
• • • This duly doeH noL purmit such a public 
service corporation to pick ont good portions of 
a partic·ular lelTi(ory, setTe only select customers 
under private contract, awl refu:se serviee (vvhich 
it aloue ea11 gin\) to the rcmai11inp; portions of 
territory and io otlJer usen;. Uuited Fuel Co. v. 
Rd. Cmnm. of Kent 11dy, 278 U. t--;. i300, 3W, 49 
S. Ct. lGO, nl L. ~Jd. :l!JO. Yet if, is not a control-
ling factor· that tile cor;;!,rafiou sup;;lying service 
does not hold itseff out to sen·e the public gener-
ally. It ll!zs {;el'11 11dd tlwt a husi11ess may be so 
far affected with a Jm:'dir: inlcn;s/ that it is sub-
jPct to n~gulatiou as to rates aud clwrges even 
though tltc J!IIMic docs wd 1/(l/'(' the right fo de-
maud and receire scr,·icc. Oeriilan Alliance Ins. 
Co. c. Lcu;is, 2il>l U. t). :38!!, 34- S. Ct. 612, 58 L. 
Ed. 1011, L.lLA. IDl 3C, 11 8D. (lLalics mine). 
"Hcgardh)SS of tlw right of Ow public to 
demand awl rceeive sel'viee in a particular in-
stance, 01e qlwstioii wlJdJwr a husi1wss enterprise 
constitutes a pulJiie utility i;; determined by the 
nature of its opera( iuus. I<;;; eli case must stand 
upon the fade: peculiar to it. A eorvoration that 
serves snell a substantial pal'i of Lho public as 
to make its rates, dwrgec: and muilwds of opera-
tions a maUe1· of pu!Jlit· ('Oueern, welfare and 
interest subje<'l s j t self tu n·;~·u!a ti on by the duly 
eousti t ut cd gon:nJm(~lllal au! l1ority. Cl arksb~trg 
[,ight & lleot Co. r. l'i!lJ/'ic Sarin' Cmnmission,, 
84 W. Va. G:l8, 100 ~~- K ~>31. Nor sl10uld the 
curtailment of its ill(·ideulai corporate functions 
made with ilw purpo;,;e of avoiding public regu-
latory proee::;s()S he ddl:rmiHative of the true char-
ader of it;,; lmsiuc;,;s. TlJUc:, clmuging the purpose 
clause of' ih; charader, refraining from use of the 
right of cmiue11t domain, nvoiding a holding out 
to serve tl1e puhli(' V,l'llt•raily and selling only to 
seleet consumers i>y r>rivule cuJitrad eould be 
employ<~d as subterfuges by many public utility 
eompauies. If the bm:;innss iH still affecte<l with 
a public iuterest, it remains a public utility. 
"Tt is the eonclusion of this court that appel-
. ' ]aut dedicated itself to public utility service in 
behalf of a Huhstantial part of the public and 
within a substautial area as to make its business 
n matter of public c·oneern, welfare and iuten~st; 
COllHequently it is a public utility and suhjeet to 
rc•gnlation hy the Public Utilities Commission." 
'l'lw actual or potential competition with other 
eorporations engaged iu the distribution of electrical 
energy awl which business is ge11erally clothed with a 
public interest, is a fact to be eousidered in cldermining 
whether the Public Service Commission should take jur-
isdiction of the Garkaue Power Company. All electric 
companies might organize a cooperative corporation and 
make eadt eonHumer or user of the electrical energy a 
member and thereby defeat the purpose of public regu-
latiou. 
In the case of Parlett Cooperative, Inc. v. Tidewater 
Lines, Inc., 164 l\1d. 40::>, (16;) A, 31:n, the Court had 
nuder consideraticm the question as to whether the Par-
lett Cooperative, l11c. came under the jurisdictiou of the 
Public Serviee Commission. 'l'he Compauy was organ-
ized to eolleetively produee, prepare for market, handle, 
store ami market, alHl particularly to transport milk and 
other products of its memherH, alHl of acting as the sell-
ing and buying agent or both, and also for any other 
purpose permitted. It had a eapital stock of $2,000, 
divided into sharPs of $10 eaeh. It operated a truek 
over a part of tlw route Herved by the 'ridewater Lines, 
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and tram;ported for hire for its stoekholders milk and 
other freight in competition with Tidewater, Inc., eon-
tended that it was a private person and uot a public 
na 
carrier, that the Public Rerviee Commission hadf jur-
isdiction. 
"11\)r reasons poiutcd out in Rutledge Coop-
erative Assn. v. Baughman, 153 l\Id. 297, 1:38 A. 
29, which need not be repeated here, a ppcllallt 's 
business is necessarily impressed with a public 
interest. It is a corporation with an identity 
distinct from its stockholders, who arc not obliged 
to ship over its lines, and whose stock may be held 
as any other iuvestment. At its will, its stoek may 
he so distributed that it may serve as mnuy 
persons as it could if it were a common carrier 
operating over the same route. rrhe par value of 
its stock is teu dollars. By the mere dcviec of 
issuing to eaeh of them a share of stock, it 
could secure as patrcllls all persons needing sueh 
service as it offers overs the route it serves. 
1 ts operation would damage the highways to the 
same extent as any other public carrier. If it 
sees fit, it eau awl will serve the whole public 
willing to buy a share of stoek and in need of 
sueh service as it offers, as would any other public 
earrier, and its gains will be distributed to its 
stockholders as would those of any other public 
earrier. It is in aetive, real, and injurious <·om-
rwtition with other public earriers, and tlw form 
of its organization is little more thau a deviee to 
use the eorporation laws of the state to permit 
it to operate~ in the guise of a private carrier when 
il all essential elements its business is that of a 
public earric~r. Its ineideuts, its powers, and its 
operations are not to be distinguiRhcd from those 
of a public earrier, awl in truth and in fact it is 
a public carrier.'' 
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Now we C('illt~ I'· iill ann:~·si:-: of <'t~rtain eases which 
have het'll l'i~ud hy 1\tc (brk:llle l'm\'(~1' Company <IIHl the 
Rural l1Jj~,f·t rifieai imJ /ulmini::·; raiiou. 
n,] t!1c J\dminit·draiion have 
qnotell exit~m:in !y. /, l'al':'L'Il' r; ndim;· of tlwt ease, ho-.,v-
evcr, \\'ill disdo:;e LiJ<:i (he cil'HteHU·: present in this 
case were cntin·ly !:lrL:illp; in l!J N<:lsmt case (State 
ex r-cl. P!i{;fic Fiil.'f :r·s Cou1 1:1 ::;siuu of IT taft i'. Nelson, 
65 Ut. 457, :.:::~8 P. :2::7) <l1ttl fur: ilc·r that tlw Court placed 
its d(:('ic;in;t mn:ni,\· u;w11 :lw f:w! iltat ilw mall operating 
ihe emTi<tg-c iilles \':n:,: duilt~',' ''O ;:H <ill ag·cut of the com-
pany. "1t was in vir~.lH~ of U11: ('Olil raet madt: hy him 
with Ute m;~:uci<tLcn, «nd nul cllll~rwisc, lind he <•lJg·agecl 
in the bm;iucss <•r empi<;yrrwnt," aud fnrtlwr, that the 
trmlRporL\timt \\':tS Jl(,~ ; ht• mnill or principal object of 
bm;iness. H w:1s lmt :ill iH('!:klll O!' :-'(~('(Jil<btr)' to mwllwr, 
the eornnnmi 1 ~- ('<tnl., J :t 11d i h-; mnini ewmec. If under such 
eirenms1auct:s, 1>e'< lter i !L' m;sue::d ion uor tlw defendant 
under his e01I1rat·! with!;, willtont a permit or certificate 
from th(' c(;mmis:;inu. 'Oil d l:1 v,·l'u! ;_,. ~;o transport gnesh; 
amJ SUJliJiies of t]Je ilc',H!i<'i<!(i;J]l to HJI(] from the eamp, 
them eculd Jto1 a mi11:H:.; t(J1ll[1;;ny optT<ding <1 mine up 
or rw:tr tl1e (<lll.\'!Jlt ir;JJ';;wrt i1s t~mpioyees aml fn:ight 
ami suppl;es 1o nnd frum i s mine, or lt~gally make a 
cuniract ,,;:11 Hli(J;iiu·w d,, so, \\'itllont a permit from the 
eomm1sswn. 
\VP Lel~c'<' :Lni tL· ~' i:;ull t·mw I8 uot con-
tro1ling. 'l'!t( r::.;t;..;·:.w;.:;<· (:I ujl~ Nuprerne Court, I 
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admit may he used as a persuasive argument on the 
question of public service, hut I am inclined to the be-
lief that if the faets vverc presented that the device was 
used merely as a cloak or method to evade the statutes, 
the Supreme Court would not hesitate io hold that the 
Commission had jurisdiction. 
]'or a discussiou of similar decisions to that of the 
Utah Supreme Court, see 44 Harvard Law Review, 530. 
I think that it will become appareut on a reading of that 
article that the decision of the Supreme Court did not 
have such a wide effeet as is eonteuded for hy the Rural 
Electrification Administration. 
There are two eases cited by the Rural Electrifi-
cation Admiuistratiou which are difficult to differentiate. 
One of those cases is State Public Ut,ilities v. Bethany 
Mutual Telephone Assn., 110 N.E. 334. \Vhile the Court 
did hold that a telephone company limited strictly to 
members of the eorporatiou did not come within the 
purview of the Public Regulatory Acts, the Court said, 
"the purpose of the act is to bring under control by the 
public, for the common good, property applied to a 
public use in which the public has au interest.'' but 
decided that this eompany had not rledieated its property 
to a public use. The Court also discussed the case of 
Public Utilities v. Noble "~Jutual Telephone Company, 
268 Ill. 411, (109 N.E. 298), aud the case of the Bun-
combe Metallic '_Celeplwuc Co. (Buncombe ilJetallir: Tel-
ephone Co. v. McGinnis, 2G8 Ill. 504), (109 N.E. 257). 
It is clear that in the Betlmny ease the court deeided 
that case solely on the delimitation of the powers of the 
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Company, as foull<l in ilH~ ehnrter. H iR tlte ron tent ion 
of your defendant that the testimony before tlte Com-
misRion sltowR that the Garkane Company intends to 
serve evPryone in the territory who will beeome a mem-
ber and abide by its ruleR, awl pay the costs of memher-
ship, if the TJerRon d<>siring to gr~t the servire lives 
within the agreed (liRtanee from the line. 
A reading of the ease of Public Utilities 
Commission rs. Noble, 27G Ill. 121, 1B N.K mo, will 
disclose that Uw holding of the Supn~me Court of Tllinois 
in that em;e, ~which was decided after the Bethany ease, 
is in favor of the contention of your defendant. \Vith 
this faet iu mind, 1 would like to eitc the ease of Kitsap 
Co. Transportation Co. 'I'S. 1~1anitrm Assn., 176 \Vash. 
Rep. 486, the ease of Northslwre vs. Bus'incssmen's Asso-
ciafion, 1~)(j 1\limt. :3:3G, ami the ease of Borough of Am-
I . i I) ll. S' . C' . . j' J> 1 {~'"' Atl Jnr ge vs. u; 7C , en·u·e ,omm?.ssuJn o a., uu . 
47. Here the Conrt in deciding the cm;e used this 
language: 
"'l'he sole question is wltdlwr the Byers Co. 
m selling water to tltr~ Spang Co. is operating 
as a publie sr'n·i<'e <'ompauy." 
'l'he Court :-mstni!l(~d thP Commission m deeirling 
that they had no jurisdiction o\·er the Byers Co., hut 
a reading of the fads disdose that tlte Byen; Co. ~was 
furnishing watt~r but to o1w company, the flpang Co., 
and athough it would nppear that the Byers Co. wa:,; 
elearly a private eompany, tlw Court took eonsiderahle 
time to diseuss the e:,;st~ntial differenee hetweeu a private 
company and a puhlic S(~rvwe eompany. 'l'lte eourt said 
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that "the furnishing of water to a single consumer in 
no way involves a puhlie iutcrcst; nor can it be said 
that by its aet tlmt it has devoted itR water business to 
a public * * * regulation." Aml yd iu the language of 
the Court, '"rlw Byers Co. is a private mmmfacturiug 
corporation; it has no charter rights to supply water to 
the public; it has no grant of any rights to occupy streets 
or other property with \Vater lines, and therefore has 
neither rights nor power to render puhlie service." How 
different arc the faet8 i11 tl1e ease before this Commis-
sion. Sec in re Fa,nners' ,~1utual Tefeplwne Co., 8 P.U.R. 
(N.S.) 260; lnd. Oas Co. i'S. l)u/;/ic Utilities Commission, 
21 N.E. 2nd 166. 
It is the contention of the Public Se1Tiee Commis-
sion that the Garkane Corporation offers to serve, and 
will, any of tlw public who will !J(~eome a member of it, 
in addition to its original membcn;, nnd for that reason, 
is subject to tlw jurisdictiou of the Public Service 
Commission. State ex rel. lle!Jn rs. Trego County Coop-
erative Telephone Crnnpauy, 212 Fae. ~)02, 112 Kans. 
701. Gillman vs. 8umnu;rsct Fanners Cooperative Tele-
phone Company, 151 Atl. 440, 12D l'.lc. 243. 
We now come to ihe \Vasl1iugton <'Hse lately decided 
(Inland Empire Rural l't'lcrlrificatirm Inc. z:s. Depart-
ment of Public 8e1·uice, !J2 Pae. 2ud. 238). That case at 
first blush would appeur to be pursuasive, lmt a careful 
examination will show that llte r·ase wa::; not based upon 
evidence suel1 a8 \\'Hi:l addue<~d hy tlw Puhlie Service 
Commissio11 of Utah, uor was it lJasr'd upou a similar 
statute to that of the State of Utah. 
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"for l1in~,'' i'uL;::d > 
court says: 
' \Vr;U ~i t_ <;!' 
·' ;, 
nddi: · ~,,;!:~ (' 
,:) 
.I 
I<Wlle mnd1 of the words 
:·, ,;, ~<:dnte, l'or, as tlw 
:: .~1 li~:{:Jl n li 1 end applica-
,:~ .. \' :·wi iol'il1 respc.rJdt~nt 
z· ,;,,. l~iil },d,and 
lil(· 1:i:3:J .\et, both 
,,. ,. , '" 1 ::e i 'ulliil' Nl~rviee 
(:·n:nE:.: ~.j~_ ·. :-: · i~ ,, ;·, Jt;n·:~'llt ;:--; a1t 'elee-
ll'i(·cL ;_··: J•l .·~· 1.11 ie:~~i ri.eal pl.a11t' 
i11 t.L~;·~ ~-.:. ~·~·, i · 1 ' ,'~c::~~u iilt!l it (~xaets 
fnTn ; .: : •. · :. "' 1 ,(, .. : ;;n for its service, 
<~11',; .::-. . . , .. u:. O\\·,;(•rsl!ip, and 
1H\ :r· .... < \ ,t_;-; fn~··~~l\ 1 1' 1o iNSllU, 
it-s :J.{ ;< ;:;; !;l'0 1;rr1y. ll(f\X-
e'.Tl', · .. • ·' ,,, '·., ·,d. cur determina-
rc~-:.; .. 1 •• :; , 
('f;i'por;·;~1 ~Cll 
Hh_'Ht; (_, !' 
tily- -~ n 
f~ u; 'i' .\', ': . ;~, 
bei11g· :·1 (-1 c.'' 
It \\'ili I 
is not suc1 ,,~, :·:;;, u: 
j ~ ' ' 
'. 
::i: :·,;i dd'!niiimJs, 
:a \•: a pH!Jlie Sl~n·we 
!:til'\,('\\ of the public 
l' 
rl't't'Ii;L:-; Hl'P re-
, :ill!!ilil or vaeh 
I> It~ !'' ~_ on1plele "~dell­
'"' 'orp;;raiu agency 
~~:,;_t • rlc !H~r~;lfo!lh \\'ho arc~ 
;i,,l ·il 1i1:li ,;t~;<·, JJo mention is 
a eorpunl!iUll L< C(:Lk·:-: '' ;:ull J', S(;l'v.<·t• (·orporation 
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subject to regulation hy the Department of Public Ser-
vice only when, ancl to the extent that, its hut>ines:,; is 
dedicated or devoted to a public use, iR not the ROll~ 
ha:,;is of determining the jurisdiction of a public service 
cormmission. 'l'lw fad that the Compauy may have 
franchiseR similar to those given to tlw Garkaue Com-
pany should he a factor. The fact that anyone who 
wishes to join the corporation may get the service:,; of 
the corporation should he a factor. 'rhe fact that approx-
imately 80 or 8G(Y,1 of the public in the area arc members 
Rhould be a factor. The fad that the Company will sell 
applianeeR, and if propt>r Rafe-guarding of the eonsumers 
is not aeeompliRhed hy the Commission, they may he left 
without atlequate :,;erviee at a time when they need it 
moRt. Unh~sR the CommiRsion sds up adequate rates 
and 8inking fund reRerves, tlw plant may not be re-
placed, and the eoJIRumers may he left with lines and 
appliances and no electrical energy to supply them. 
Certainly the language of the Court: 
"The tt>st to he applied iR whether or not 
the corporation holds it8elf out, expressly or 
impliedly, to supply it8 8erviec or prouuct for 
use, either hy the public as a class or by that 
portion of it that can be served by the utility, 
or whctht•r, 011 the contrary, it rnerely offers to 
serve rmly ]Jarticular indiuiduals of its o1on sele(·-
tion" (page 2G:-:l), eamwt he, 110r ever wa8, the tm.;t 
of whether or not a corporation wa8 8Uhjed to 
the juri8diction of a public servi(·e eommisRion, 
or wh(•ther or not it wa8 within the definitioll8 of 
a statute 8imilar to our8, 
and shows that the premi8e upon whieh the decisiou is 
based is uot supporteu l1y the authoritic8. Sec City of 
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Chicago 1'8. A {ton R.R. Co., B:-i5 Ill. p. 65; Pioneer Tele-
phrme Oo. rs. State et al., 144 Pae. 1060 (Okla.); Valcour 
vs. Village, etc., 2 Atl. 2nd 312; Mumn vs. Illinois, 94 
U.S. 12fi. Seo Celina 011d Mer('(~r Counties TelephMie Co. 
vs. Union Center JJutual Telephone, Association, 133 
N.~J. 540, 21 A.L.R. 1145; soe ah;o the note to that case 
at 21 A.L.R. page 1Hi2. See Public Utility Regulations 
by Mosher and Crawford, pages 6, 469, and 480. Affili-
ated 8er1'ice .Corp. os. Public Utilitif,s Commission, 186 
Jete. ~e 
N.K 10:~, 10:1 A.L.R. 264, 51 C .• T. .........,.,, 2 ~ 4. l"'t":'\~ J 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that the decision of the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah, subjediug the Garkane Power Com-
pany to its jurisdiction and granting to them a Certifi-
cate of Convenience and N eeessity is corroct as to law 
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Of REA Unit 
The Utah supreme court i,s 
destined to hand down an opinion 
of great importance to cooperative 
electrification projects in a 
case which was heard by the court 
Monday, 
The case. is an appeal from a de-
cision of the Utah public service 
commission that the Garkane Pow-
er association, a project financed 
by the rural electrification admin-
Istration, is subject to state super-
vision. 
The question involved has been 
passed on only once before by a 
'state supreme court, and that was 
in the state of Washington. The 
case there was brought before the 
high court on a declaratory judg-
ment demurrer, instead of on. ap-
peal as in Utah. 
R E A Sends Counsel 
Because of the significance of 
the Utah case the R E A eent its 
general counsel, Vincent D. Nich-
olson, to Salt Lake City to· pre-
sent arguments before the court. 
The public service commission was 
represented by John D. Rice, lilS· 
sistant attorney general. Mr. Nich-
olson. was assisted by Warren W. 
Porter of Panguitch, attorney for 
the Garkane Power association, 
which provides service in Garfield 
and Kane counties. 
Mr. Nicholson argued that the 
association is not subject to the 
supervision of the public service 
commission because it is not a pub-
lic utility in the ordinary sense. 
He declared there is an identity of 
interest between supplier and con-
sumer, while a public utility is a 
profit corporation "doing business 
at arm's length with the consum-
ing public." 
State Claims Control 
Mr. Rice said it was testified be· 
fore the commission that anyone 
who wanted to join the associa-
tion and thus obtain electric serv-
ice would be accepted. He de-
clared that even though the asso-
cia,tion calls itself a cooperative, it 
serves a large section of the public 
in its territory and therefore is, 
in fact, a utility subject to state 
supervision. 
In the Washington case the court 
held in favor of the R E A. 
